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Abstract
African swine fever (ASF), classical swine fever (CSF) and foot-and-mouth disease
(FMD) are considered to be three of the most detrimental animal diseases and are
currently foreign to the U.S. Emerging and re-emerging pathogens can have tremendous impacts in terms of livestock morbidity and mortality events, production losses,
forced trade restrictions, and costs associated with treatment and control. The
United States is the world's top producer of beef for domestic and export use and
the world's third-largest producer and consumer of pork and pork products; it has
also recently been either the world's largest or second largest exporter of pork and
pork products. Understanding the routes of introduction into the United States and
the potential economic impact of each pathogen are crucial to (a) allocate resources
to prevent routes of introduction that are believed to be more probable, (b) evaluate
cost and efficacy of control methods and (c) ensure that protections are enacted to
minimize impact to the most vulnerable industries. With two scoping literature reviews, pulled from global data, this study assesses the risk posed by each disease in
the event of a viral introduction into the United States and illustrates what is known
about the economic costs and losses associated with an outbreak.
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1 | I NTRO D U C TI O N

security (FAO, 2019a). Emerging and re-emerging pathogens pose
a significant threat to livestock industries across the globe, as they

Domestic livestock production plays a vital role in human health and

can have serious impacts in terms of livestock morbidity and mortal-

nutrition, food security, rural poverty reduction and overall agro-

ity, production losses, consumer demand and costs associated with

nomic health (Randolph et al., 2007; Tomley & Shirley, 2009). The

treatment and control. Some of the most challenging and econom-

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 40% of the

ically burdensome diseases are those transmitted between wildlife

global value of agricultural output is provided by livestock and 1.3 bil-

and domestic animals (Miller et al., 2017). Diseases transmitted at

lion people are dependent on livestock for their livelihoods and food

the domestic animal–wildlife interface are increasingly challenging
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veterinary health systems with African swine fever (ASF), classical

African swine fever virus (ASFV), a large, double-stranded DNA

swine fever (CSF) and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) being three of

virus in the Asfarviridae family, is the causative agent of African

the most concerning among animal diseases (OIE, 2019). Globally,

swine fever. This virus is believed to have evolved in southern and

between 1995 and 2005, the number of outbreaks of these three

eastern Africa (Penrith, 2009) as a sylvatic cycle exists between

diseases reached all-time maximums (Figure 1) and has continued

warthogs (Phacochoerus africanus) and soft ticks (Ornithodoros;

to be important animal diseases of economic concern (OIE, 2019).

Bakkes et al., 2018). While asymptomatic in warthogs, ASF is a haem-

Disease control measures such as movement bans, culling and

orrhagic disease that can cause mortality nearing 100% in suscepti-

vaccination (when available) can be used to reduce the frequency

ble populations of domestic swine and wild boar (Blome et al., 2013).

of disease already present in a population by eliminating causes

In 2007, ASFV was introduced to the Caucuses region and subse-

of disease or reducing them to levels of little or no consequence.

quently spread throughout Europe and Asia infecting domestic and

Analysis of the effectiveness of a disease mitigation strategy is

wild pigs. In the fall of 2018, the virus was introduced to China and

difficult because of inherent uncertainties about the likelihood of

has spread rampantly throughout Southeast Asia (FAO, 2019b; Le

disease outbreak and spread parameters (Elbakidze et al., 2009).

et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2018).

Further, the ideal cost-minimizing strategies (determined in either

Classical swine fever virus (CSFV) is a pestivirus which is the

ex-ante or ex-post analysis) also depend on relative costs, ancillary

causative agent of classical swine fever. Infection can take sev-

benefits and effectiveness of mitigation strategies (Elbakidze &

eral forms (acute, chronic or prenatal) depending on the virus

McCarl, 2006). For these reasons, ‘explicit risk-based investigation’

strain and host immune status, which is heavily influenced by age

(Elbakidze et al., 2009, p. 932) of mitigation of these three diseases

(Moennig, 2000). Clinical signs can range from acute death to

are necessary to inform the possible outbreak costs and benefits of

non-specific signs, including fever, anorexia, lethargy, respiratory

mitigation. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of the risks and

signs, conjunctivitis, diarrhoea and central nervous system involve-

consequences associated with a potential outbreak of ASF, CSF and/

ment (Brown & Bevins, 2018a). Although CSFV is often fatal, death

or FMD is crucial in order to (a) allocate resources to prevent routes

may or may not follow imminently. Neonatal piglets infected with

of introduction that are believed to be more probable, (b) consider

CSFV in utero may be aborted or stillborn or demonstrate congen-

costs and efficacy of control methods and (c) ensure that appropri-

ital signs soon after birth resulting in death, depending on when in

ate mitigation tactics are put in place to minimize impact to the most

utero the foetus was exposed. Classical swine fever was eradicated

vulnerable industries. Here, we illustrate the findings of two sepa-

from the United States in 1976 after an official eradication scheme

rate scoping reviews of global literature to identify epidemiological

began in 1961 (Edwards et al., 2000). Presently, the virus is endemic

risks, economic measures and scientific gaps for ASF, CSF and FMD.

in several countries in South and Central America, Asia, and parts

FIGURE 1
com]

Number of ASF, CSF and FMD outbreaks worldwide, by year (OIE, 2019) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
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of Eastern Europe and neighbouring countries. The presence of the

considerable impact of these three diseases, they have been the

virus in Africa is unknown (Blome et al., 2017).

focus of a significant number of studies evaluating risks which

Foot-and-mouth disease, caused by foot-and-mouth disease

have sought to provide guidance it mitigate risk, conduct con-

virus (FMDV), is a highly contagious virus that infects cloven-hoofed

tingency planning and insights to potential economic outcomes

animals, including cattle, buffaloes, sheep, goats, pigs and various

(e.g. Boklund et al., 2013; Halasa, Boklund, et al., 2016; Halasa,

wildlife species (FAO, 2012; Grubman & Baxt, 2004). This virus can

Bøtner, et al., 2016). The majority of this work has likely resulted

be spread both horizontally and vertically and causes low mortal-

from World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) requirements to

ity but high morbidity. These disease dynamics contribute to the

conduct risk and economic consequence assessments, resulting

significant costs associated with an outbreak as affected animals

in most available assessments being narrowly focused to specific

have reduced growth rates and decreased milk production resulting

geographic region(s) and often addressing OIE guidelines. Despite

from vesicles that develop in and around the oral cavity and along

the significant amount of work available for ASF, CSF and FMD,

the hooves (Alexandersen et al., 2003). Foot-and-mouth disease is

there remains a paucity of work to synthesize the literature and

endemic in large areas of Asia and Africa, and South America had

identify gaps and needs.

its most recent outbreak in Colombia in 2017. Based on strict trade

Knowledge about the economic consequences of ASF, CSF and

measures, North America, Europe and Australia have been able to

FMD can better inform effective allocation of resources for dis-

maintain an FMDV-free status in recent years without vaccination

ease prevention and potential response. Economic analyses have

(Niedbalski et al., 2019).

been carried out in regions around the world since at least the

Transboundary animal diseases are challenging to manage as

late 1970s; however, there has yet to be a rigorous meta-analy-

the demand for animal protein increases, globalization of inter-

sis or review of either the economic literature for ASF, CSF and

national trade increases, and climate change continually threat-

FMD individually or collectively in more than 10 years. Knight-

ens ecosystems and agricultural production systems. Given the

Jones and Rushton (2013) provide an extensive table of existing

TA B L E 1

Risk evaluation & economic scoping review, PRISMA steps
Search terms

Exclusion criteria

PRISMA step

Text evaluated

Risk

Economic

Risk

Economic

Identification

Primary search
terms in title,
abstract, index
terms

[Disease
name] + risk + assessment
OR analysis OR pathway

[Disease name] + economic
[Disease name] + ‘economic
damage’
economic
loss
cost

Studies without
Identification
primary search
terms in title,
abstract or index
terms

Studies without
Identification
primary search
terms in title,
abstract or index
terms

Screening

NA

NA

NA

Not published in
peer-reviewed
journal or as
government
technical report
Unable to locate
Not in English
Does not pertain
to (disease OR
Risk analysis)

Not published in
peer-reviewed
journal
Unable to locate
Not in English
Does not pertain
to (disease OR
economic analysis)

Eligibility

Secondary search
terms in full text

Risk
Pathway
Assessment
Analysis

Economic
Cost
Loss
Dollar
Total
‘Total economic’

Do not present
own results

Do not present own
results
No outbreak cost/
loss analysis

Included

Full text

NA

NA

Not published in
peer-reviewed
journal or as
government
technical report
Unable to locate

Not published in
peer-reviewed
journal
Unable to locate
No outbreak cost/
loss analysis
No historic
exchange rate
available for time
of study

|
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cost–benefit analysis studies of FMD control and eradication pro-
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outbreak. We originally anticipated this to be a U.S. focused review;

grams as a part of their original economic analysis (Knight-Jones &

however, the paucity of available data forced us to expand our ef-

Rushton, 2013). However, the paper does not specifically function

forts to a global scale.

as a scoping or systematic literature review. Bennett and IJpelaar
(2005) also carried out a review of 34 endemic diseases to Great
Britain where they outlined new developments in economic anal-

2 | M E TH O DS

ysis and updated disease cost estimates; however, they did not
report a table of all findings and briefly summarize results with no

We used systematic scoping reviews as our primary tool given

mention of FMD (Bennett & IJpelaar, 2005). While acknowledging

the large, heterogeneous nature of comparing epidemiological

that many economic evaluations of non-zoonotic animal disease

and economic literature. These reviews were based on the meth-

programs have been carried out on an ad hoc basis, Perry & Grace

odological guidance outlined by Peters et al. (2015) and utilized

(2009) conclude that the varying diseases, methodologies and

the PRISMA methods (Preferred Reporting Items of Systematic

results make it difficult to draw general conclusions or compare

Reviews and Meta-Analyses; Moher et al., 2009, 2015) for sys-

diseases (Perry & Grace, 2009). It should also be noted that most

tematic scoping reviews. Specific text evaluated, search terms and

of these studies have been carried out in developed countries and

exclusion criteria, based on each PRISMA step, are outlined for

those from developing counties rarely consider the differential im-

the risk evaluation and economic literature reviews (respectively)

pact on the poor (Perry & Grace, 2009).

in Table 1.

The objective of our study is twofold. First, to identify and illustrate potential risks (epidemiological or economic) posed by ASF,
CSF and FMD. Second, to identify knowledge gaps and opportuni-

2.1 | Scoping review 1: risk evaluation

ties to better inform policy, risk management and applied research.
To accomplish this, we used two separate scoping reviews. We first

In the risk evaluation scoping review, we examined the range of

present the methods and results of these two scoping reviews. We

studies evaluating risk that have been conducted for ASF, CSF and

then discuss the risks and economic implications of each of these

FMD globally. Risk assessment is a broad area of analysis that can

diseases based on the findings of both reviews. Finally, we conclude

represent quantitative or qualitative analyses and can be limited to

by illuminating the most important takeaways from this analysis,

just the pathway of introduction or include an analysis of the mech-

and consider the roles invasive feral swine may play in transmission

anisms which drive disease spread. Within the OIE framework,

dynamics of these diseases in the United States in the event of an

risk assessment is a rigorous structured approach that conducts

FIGURE 2

Risk evaluation scoping literature review, PRISMA outcomes [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Economics scoping literature review, PRISMA outcomes

specific assessments—release assessment, exposure assessment,

2.2 | Scoping review 2: economic impact

probability of occurrence—which are used with a consequence assessment to arrive at a final risk estimation (Dufour et al., 2011).

In the economic impact scoping review, we identified where ASF,

To capture the breadth of studies investigating potential risks as-

CSF and FMD studies have been carried out, compare economic

sociated with these pathogens, all literature evaluating risks were

outcomes and identify research gaps. Studies were classified by

considered eligible and are reflected in the use of broad search

the pathogen type and sorted by continent and country. Literature

terms. We did not limit our search to only studies using OIE risk

included was found through Google Scholar and the PRIMO (Peer-

assessment framework as many studies address only a few aspects

Reviewed Instructional Materials Online) database. Peer-reviewed

of the framework. All scientific peer-reviewed literature from jour-

literature published any year through 2019, in English, was included.

nals, edited book volumes, government reports, technical docu-

Methodological quality was not assessed in this review as it is not a

ments or other similar documents were considered eligible, as well

specific criterion for scoping reviews [29]; however, inclusion of only

as grey literature consisting of mainly unpublished government re-

peer-reviewed literature should imply methodological soundness.

ports. To identify studies, we used keywords to search four data-

Grey literature was not considered in this case, and articles were not

bases (PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science and National Agricultural

retained if they only reported results from another source (results

Library). Studies in English published in any year through 2019

were then sought out in their original documentation). A total of 35

were considered eligible. Once all relevant sources were identified

sources were reviewed for the economic literature (Figure 3).

and retrieved, we reviewed each source to ensure relevance and
data were extracted. A detailed description of these are included
in Appendix Table A1, but in summary, included information pertained to pathogen type, risk evaluation type, pathways of introduction, geographic source (where the virus could come from) and

3 | R E S U LT S
3.1 | Scoping review 1: risk evaluation

destination (where the virus could end up), models used in the risk
evaluation and other pertinent information. Additionally, the asso-

3.1.1 | Geographic location

ciated highest risk variables (i.e. introduction pathway, geographic
source and destination, and consequence) were recorded in the

Thirty-two (28.6%) of the reviewed documents assessed the risks

database if they were identified by the study evaluating risk. This

posed to the United States, and the remaining 80 (71.4%) assessed

process is outlined in Figure 2, and a total of 112 literature sources

risks associated with other foreign countries. The overwhelming ma-

were included in the database.

jority of the foreign risk evaluations (51 (63.7%)) identified risk to

|
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TA B L E 2 Descriptive summary of the United States and foreign studies evaluating risk characterized by pathogen(s) evaluated and the
type of risk evaluation
Pathogen evaluated
ASFV

a

CSFV

Type of assessment
FMDV

Combination

Qualitative

Semiquantitative

Quantitative

Both

U.S. assessments

3

9

10

8

16

1

6

8

Foreign assessments

32

7

19

13

39

10

22

9

One U.S. assessment and 11 foreign assessments did not identify pathogen evaluated.

European countries and regions, and 8 (10.0%) of the foreign risk

3.1.4 | Risk evaluation types and models used

evaluations did not identify a specific geographic destination but still
evaluated possible routes of introduction, and so were considered

Of the 112 assessments, there were 55 (49.1%) qualitative reviews,

relevant to our study and included. As for the remaining foreign risk

28 (25.0%) quantitative, 11 (9.8%) semi-quantitative analyses, and 18

evaluations, 7 (8.7%) assessed risk to countries in Asia, 6 (7.5%) as-

(16.1%) performed a combination of both qualitative and quantita-

sessed New Zealand, 3 (3.7%) assessed African countries, 2 (2.5%)

tive analyses. A variety of models were used within the literature, in-

assessed Canada, 2 (2.5%) assessed Brazil, and 1 (1.2%) assessed the

cluding, but not limited to: net trade, stochastic, multi-level binomial,

risk to Australia.

logistic and linear regression, Monte Carlo simulations, Hierarchal
cluster analyses and Scenario trees. Table 2 itemizes the pathogen(s)
evaluated and the types of assessments utilized.

3.1.2 | U.S. risk evaluation: highest risk geographic
source and destination

3.1.5 | Assessed pathways of introduction

Of the 32 documents evaluating risk to the United States, only
6 (18.7%) identified specific countries as being the most likely

The majority of the studies evaluating risk considered many path-

source of an outbreak. The geographic locations identified

ways for pathogens to be introduced to a specific country or con-

were Asia, Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Germany,

tinent. The primary pathways of disease introduction assessed by

Italy, Russia and the United Kingdom. Ten studies evaluating

all 112 studies included the following: natural movement of wildlife;

risk (31.2%) identified risks below the national scale, identify-

legal and illegal imports of animals and animal products including

ing specific locations within the United States as the highest risk

bushmeat and genetic material; by way of commercial, personal, or

for virus introduction. These locations were California, Florida,

military planes, ships, vehicles and mail; and bioterrorism. Many risk

Iowa, Minnesota, Puerto Rico, Texas, Wisconsin and the south-

evaluations then determined which of the assessed pathways of dis-

west region of the U.S, as well as the major airports of Florida,

ease introduction could be the highest risk to the country or region

New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Puerto Rico, Rhode

being evaluated.

Island, Texas and Virginia. Risk factors common among these
states included (a) dense livestock populations, (b) large international airports, (c) existing feral swine populations and (d) presence of swine waste feeding operations.

3.1.6 | Foreign assessments: highest risk pathway of
introduction
Across all three diseases, 34 (42.5%) of the foreign assessments

3.1.3 | Pathogens evaluated

did not identify a highest risk pathway of introduction, but of the
46 that did, the majority (32 (69.6%)) identified legal and illegal

Thirty-three (29.5%) of the 112 total studies evaluating risk spe-

importations of live animals, meat and meat products, animal feed,

cifically assessed ASF, 17 (15.2%) assessed CSF, and 29 (25.9%) as-

genetic material and bioterrorism to be the pathways of highest

sessed FMD. Another 21 (18.7%) assessed a combination of two or

risk. Another 8 (17.4%) identified cross-border movements of live-

more diseases, and 12 (10.7%) risk evaluations did not identify a spe-

stock or wild boar, 6 (13.0%) identified swill-feeding, 6 (13.0%)

cific disease and so are not included in ‘Pathogen Evaluated’ section

identified cross-border movements of livestock trucks, and 2

of Table 1. However, these studies evaluating risk were considered

(4.3%) identified other fomites such as shoes, clothing, supplies

relevant as they still evaluated potential pathways of introduction

and fresh-cut grass from infected areas. It is important to note that

to a country for ‘any foreign disease’, which while not specifically

some assessments reported multiple pathways of introduction as

stated, is assumed to include ASF, CSF and FMD.

highest risk.

1916
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The only pathway of introduction that varied based on disease

partial budget model (PBM), referred to as ‘financial costing’ (FC)

within the foreign assessments was returning livestock vehicles

where a more accounting-type approach is taken to quantify eco-

and other fomites. This pathway was identified as highest risk pri-

nomic impacts. Across all studies, a total economic cost or loss (or

marily by European assessments evaluating the risk posed by ASF.

combination of the two) was estimated, often pertaining to agricul-

Only two assessments, also European, identified returning livestock

tural production loss and epidemic control costs. Costs were often

trucks specifically as highest risk for CSF, and none of the foreign

associated as government costs, and loss was most often reported as

assessments evaluating FMD reported any fomites as a highest risk

production loss to the livestock or milk industries. To our knowledge,

pathway of introduction.

no studies specifically addressed feral swine as the primary source
of disease introduction but several studies suggested with may contribute to establishment and spread if the disease was introduced.

3.1.7 | U.S. assessments: highest risk pathway of
introduction

The range of costs and/or losses presented for ASF was from
$649,000 to $94,539,870,064 (USD, 2019) which represent the
average annual pig production loss from an outbreak in Nigeria

Of the 32 U.S. assessments, 17 (53.1%) did not identify a pathway

(Fasina et al., 2012) and the total economic loss value of swine de-

of introduction of highest risk, but 11 assessments (34.4%) identi-

populated from an outbreak in Spain (Bech-Nielsen et al., 1993),

fied legal or illegal imports (including bioterrorism) of animals, ani-

respectively. The range of costs and/or losses presented for CSF

mal products, animal feed or genetic material, as the highest risk

was from $58,338 to $585,762,061 (USD, 2019) which represent

pathway of introduction, most commonly by way of air passenger or

the total direct annual production loss from an outbreak in Australia

air passenger baggage. In addition, 2 U.S. assessments (6.2%) iden-

(Garner et al., 2001) and the maximum median epidemic cost (based

tified swill-feeding as being the highest risk pathway of introduc-

on infected herd) of an outbreak in Denmark (Boklund et al., 2009),

tion, 1 (3.1%) identified the importation of diagnostic samples, and 1

respectively. Finally, the range of costs and/or losses presented for

(3.1%) identified Ornithodoros ticks, as they can be vectors for ASF.

FMD was between $83 and $84,584,000,000 (USD, 2019) which

Importantly, these ticks were identified to be the highest risk in com-

represent total average economic loss per herd from an outbreak

parison with all other tick species that can transmit the disease; how-

in Ethiopia (Jemberu et al., 2014) and the maximum, median total

ever, ticks as vectors were not identified as a highest risk pathway of

national loss in agricultural surplus from an outbreak in California

introduction to the United States when compared to all other pos-

in the United States (Carpenter et al., 2011), respectively. These

sible routes of introduction. Unlike the foreign assessments, none of

ranges highlight the fact that geospatial information and scale are

the U.S. assessments identified wild boar or their movements as a

paramount to compare studies and since that was not uniform, it

highest risk pathway of introduction.

is nearly impossible to make generalizations about which of these
diseases is the most costly.

3.2 | Scoping review 2: economic impact

The economic scoping review affirmed that an outbreak of
any of these diseases is expensive and that the economic impact
of each disease is driven by a number of factors, including loca-

A total of 36 peer-reviewed articles were found, in English, which

tion of outbreak (e.g. Hop et al., 2016; Mahul & Durand, 2000;

presented their own economic analysis. One article by Garner and

Pendell et al., 2007), trade implications (e.g. Babalobi et al., 2007;

Lack (1995) addressed both a study on CSF and another on FMD.

Countryman & Hagerman, 2017; Mangen et al., 2004) and consumer

Broken down, we identified six studies for ASF (16.2% of all 37

reaction (e.g. Blake et al., 2003; Thompson et al., 2002). The results

disease studies), eight for CSF (21.6%), and 23 for FMD (62.2%)

of the review also implied that disease management and control

(Figure 3) for a total of 37 studies within 36 articles. Eight institu-

practices heavily contribute to the economic impact of the disease

tional or government reports were reviewed and not included in the

(e.g. Boklund et al., 2009; Schoenbaum & Disney, 2003). Comparing

selection because they were not published through the peer-review

across studies, analyses were often partial in terms of total impact

process. The economic evaluations carried out among the studies in-

evaluation (micro and macroeconomic), therefore not capturing the

cluded the following: Agricultural sector model (ASM), benefit–cost

full burden on the economy.

analysis (BCA), computable general equilibrium (CGE), economic im-

Of the 37 studies, a total of nine peer-reviewed published stud-

pact assessment (EIA), input–output (I/O), partial equilibrium (PE),

ies were ‘retrospective’ studies (25.7%) and the remaining 26 studies

Study type

Description

Retrospective

Ex-post analysis of historical outbreak. Provides an
economic impact value based on observed outcomes of
the outbreak

Forecast

Hypothetical outbreak scenario. Purpose is economic
impact evaluation for future outbreak potential

# Studies
9

26

TA B L E 3 Count of studies included in
literature review, by study type

|
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Count of countries with economic analyses, by disease, by ‘Retrospective’ (Retro.) or ‘Forecast’ (For.)

Country
name

FMD
Retro.

FMD For.

ASF Retro.

ASF For.

CSF Retro.

CSF For.

Total
Retro.

Total For.

Total
analysesa

Argentina

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Australia

0

1

0

0

0

2

0

3

3

Belgium

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

Brazil

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Colombia

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Denmark

0

2

0

1

0

1

0

4

4

Ecuador

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Ethiopia

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

France

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Germany

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

Netherlands

0

1

1

0

2

3

3

4

7

New Zealand

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Nigeria

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

2

Spain

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

S. Sudan

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Taiwan

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Turkey

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

UK

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

2

USA

0

9

0

1

0

0

0

10

10

Uruguay

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Venezuela

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Total

11

16

2

4

2

8

15

28

43

a

Totals presented here are not counts of individual studies—they are counts of economic analyses by country.

were categorized as ‘forecast’ (74.3%; Table 3). We define ‘retro-

studies were also carried out, one being an analysis in Turkey by

spective’ as an ex-post analysis of an actual historic outbreak with

Senturk and Yalcin (2008) which spans both Asia and Europe and

the purpose of providing an economic impact value based solely on

the other from Knight-Jones and Rushton (2013) which is a global

observed outcomes of the outbreak. A retrospective study utilizes

economic impact analysis of FMD in countries/regions in Asia,

data specifically from one historic outbreak (or outbreak period)

Africa, Europe and South America. Two studies for CSF were multi-

to determine the economic impact. We define ‘forecast’ as a study

country studies, one between the Netherlands and Germany (Hop

whereby a hypothetical outbreak scenario is created with the pur-

et al., 2016) and the other between the Netherlands and Belgium

pose of economic impact evaluation. Forecast studies often utilize

(Saatkamp et al., 2000). For FMD in the United States, Carpenter

simulation models based on historic outbreak data to provide in-

et al. (2011), Pendell et al. (2007) and Bates et al. (2003), respec-

sight into the potential economic impacts of varying outbreak sizes

tively, consider outbreaks in the state of California, the state of

and control strategies. Forecast studies often aim to inform future

Kansas (and regions within) and a three-county region in California.

epidemic outbreak management decisions. All studies which used

To explore the relationships between the prevalence of peer-re-

simulation modelling were labelled as ‘forecast’, but not all forecast

viewed research and outbreak location, we created four bivariate

studies used simulation modelling.

chloropleth world maps (Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7). Figure 4 demonstrates
the relationship between the number of outbreaks of ASF, CSF and
FMD (1975–2018) and the number of retrospective (ex-post) eco-

3.2.1 | Geographic span of analyses

nomic studies. To follow, we considered the relationship between
livestock or swine per capita and the number of forecast economic

Collectively, economic analysis was carried out in six of the seven

studies in Figures 5, 6 and 7 for FMD, ASF and CSF, respectively.

global continents. Table 4 lists the 21 countries represented in eco-

The number of livestock or swine per capita is a proxy for the weight

nomic studies and totals the number of analyses carried out by dis-

carried by livestock or swine (thus at risk for FMD, ASF or CSF) in a

ease and analysis type (retrospective or forecast). Analyses tended

country's economy.

to focus on country-wide economic effects of disease outbreaks in

Figure 4 shows the number of outbreaks of ASF, CSF and

one respective country. However, two transcontinental/global FMD

FMD (1975–2018) on the x-axis, and on the y-axis the number of
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F I G U R E 4 Number of outbreaks of ASF, CSF and/or FMD between 1975 and 2018 and number of retrospective economic studies. (1)
Data for x-axis are publicly available from the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) website (OIE, 2020) presented in Table A2 in
the Appendix. Range of years was based on year of publication for studies included in the literature review, and availability of OIE data. (2)
The 177 countries on the x-axis are arbitrarily divided into three groups (terciles) based on the number of ASF, CSF and FMD outbreaks
reported 1975–2018. Group 1X (group 1 on far left, x-axis) countries reported no outbreaks. Group 2X reported 1–9 respective disease
outbreaks. Group 3X experienced 10 outbreaks or more. (3) The y-axis is grouped by number of peer-reviewed retrospective studies by
country. Group 1Y (group 1 on bottom, y-axis) includes countries with zero retrospective studies, Group 2Y with 1 retrospective study,
and Group 3Y included with more than one retrospective study. (4) Group 1X (no outbreaks): 31 countries (shaded in light grey) (18% of
all reported countries)—incl. Australia, Canada, Norway, South Africa and Sweden. (5) Group 2X (1 to 9 outbreaks): 78 countries (44% of
all reported countries)—72 countries did not maintain any retrospective economic analyses including: the United States, over 15 European
countries, Chile and Japan (shaded in light green)—Five countries reported 1 (Argentina, South Sudan, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and
Uruguay) (shaded in blue)—Only the Netherlands published more than one study (shaded in light purple). (6) Group 3X (10 outbreaks or
more): 68 countries (38% of all reported countries). 61 including China, Italy, Russia and Spain (shaded in bright green) did not have ex-post
economic analysis [90% of Group 3X]. Seven countries—Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Turkey and Venezuela (shaded in dark
green) conducted only one analysis. No country in Group 3X performed more than one economic analysis [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
retrospective economic studies. The mean number of outbreaks

FMD on the y-axis, for 175 countries for which data were available.

across all countries was 7.8, and the median was 6. Overall, the re-

The number of livestock per capita is a proxy for the weight car-

sults in Figure 4 suggest that despite the important number of out-

ried by livestock (thus at risk for FMD) in a country's economy. In

breaks reported 1975–2018 (1,547 outbreaks of ASF, CSF and FMD,

the first tercile (less than 0.23 livestock per capita), none of the 58

collectively), few (11) retrospective economic studies have been

countries had any forecast studies. In the second tercile (more than

published. The results also suggest that there is no correlation be-

0.23 and up to 0.56 livestock per capita), only the United Kingdom

tween the frequency of disease outbreaks and number of ex-post,

(shaded in blue) conducted one simulation, and the United States

retrospective economic studies published. In particular, the top five

(shaded in light purple) conducted nine studies. The remaining 56

countries with the most total reported outbreaks (ASF, CSF, FMD

countries in that tercile did not conduct any forecast study. Among

combined) were Russia (49), China (45), Italy (43), South Africa (32)

the third tercile (59 countries, more than 0.56 animals per capita),

and Zambia (29). Based on this literature review, there are no pub-

where the number of livestock per capita is the highest, 54 countries

lished economic (retrospective or forecast) studies for these leading

(91.5% of tercile 3)—including Argentina, Canada and Spain—did not

five countries for total outbreaks.

conduct any anticipatory economic analysis despite the high poten-

Figure 5 represents the relationship between hooved livestock

tial impact to their economy given the high livestock density per

(cattle, goats, sheep and pigs) per capita in 2018 on the x-axis (in

capita. These countries are shaded in bright green. Four countries,

terciles), and the number of forecast economic studies published for

Australia, France, the Netherlands and New Zealand (shaded in dark

BROWN et al.
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F I G U R E 5 Number of head of livestock per capita (in terciles) and number of forecast economic studies for FMD. (1) For the x-axis,
number of hooved livestock by country is based on publicly available data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO). Livestock production data for ‘Livestock Primary’ animals (definitions and methodology can be found through the source
link provided; FAO, 2019c). Human population by country data was retrieved from the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs Population Dynamics data (United Nations, 2020). These numbers can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. (2) On the
x-axis, countries were divided into three groups (terciles) of 58 or 59 countries each based on the number of livestock per capita listed
for each country in 2018. Group 1X (group 1, far left on x-axis) is livestock per capita less than 0.23. Group 2X represents between 0.23
and 0.56 livestock per capita, and the third represents more than 0.56 animals per capita. Group 3X represents countries with more than
0.56 animals per capita. (3) The y-axis is grouped by number of peer-reviewed forecast economic studies for FMD by country. Group 1Y
(group 1, bottom of y-axis) includes countries with zero studies, Group 2Y had 1 retrospective study, and Group 3Y included more than one
forecast study. (4) Group 1X, 1Y countries did not publish any forecast studies for FMD (shaded in grey). (5) Among the 58 2X countries,
56 (including Brazil, Chile, Italy and Russia) did not conducted any simulated economic study (shaded in light green). The United Kingdom
(shaded in blue) conducted one simulation, and the United States (shaded in purple) conducted 9 studies. (6) Among the 59 3X countries,
54 countries (shaded in bright green)—including Argentina, Canada and Spain—did not conduct any prospective economic analysis despite
the high potential impact to their economy given the high livestock density per capita. Four countries, Australia, France, the Netherlands
and New Zealand (shaded in dark green), conducted one forecast study, and only Denmark conducted two [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
green), conducted one forecast study, and only Denmark conducted

simulated studies, and among tercile 2 studies (between 0.01 and

two (8.5% of tercile 3). The results indicate no correlation between

0.14 swine per capita, also 58 countries), only Nigeria (blue) con-

the potential impact on the economy of an FMD introduction and

ducted a forecast study. The remaining 57 countries in tercile 2

the number of forecasting analyses of the economic impact of the

(including Brazil, Chile, Italy and Russia) did not conduct any simu-

disease.

lated economic studies and are shaded in light green. For tercile 3

We carried out the same exercise for ASF and CSF, this time

(above 0.14 swine per capita), where the number of swine per cap-

using terciles based on swine per capita in 2018 on the x-axis,

ita is the highest (57 countries), 54 of those countries (94.7%, in-

and the number of forecast economic studies published for ASF

cluding Argentina, Australia, Canada, Russia and most of Europe)

(Figure 6) or CSF (Figure 7) in three terciles on the y-axis. The

did not conduct any prospective economic analysis despite the

number of swine per capita is a proxy for the weight carried by

potential impact to their economy. These countries are shaded in

swine production in a country's economy, which is at risk in the

bright green. Three countries (5.3% of tercile 3; Denmark, Spain

case of an ASF or CSF introduction. Overall, it was found that

and the United States), shaded in dark green, conducted one

regarding ASF studies (Figure 6), no countries in tercile 1 (less

forecast study each, and no country conducted more than one

than 0.01 swine per capita, 58 countries in light grey) conducted

forecast study overall. Again, the results indicate no correlation
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F I G U R E 6 Head of livestock per capita (in terciles) and number of simulated economic studies for ASF. (1) For the x-axis, the number
of swine per capita by country was based on the same publicly available data from the FAO, except only ‘pigs’ were selected from the
‘Livestock Primary’ animal data (FAO, 2019c). 171 countries had reported swine per capita data (1975–2018). The data used are presented in
Table A5 in the Appendix. (2) On x-axis, countries were divided into 3 equally sized tercile groups based on the number of swine per capita
where 1X (tercile 1, far left on x-axis) is less than 0.01 swine per capita, 2X is between 0.01 and 0.14 swine per capita and 3X is more than
0.14 swine per capita. (3) The y-axis is divided in to three groups by number of peer-reviewed forecast economic studies for ASF by country.
Group 1Y (tercile 1, bottom of y-axis) the y-axis includes countries with zero studies, Group 2Y with 1 retrospective study, and Group
3Y included with more than one forecast study. (4) In (1X,1Y) (tercile 1 for x and y axes) in light grey, no forecast studies of the economic
impact of an introduction of ASF were conducted. (5) In tercile 2X, only one country, Nigeria (shaded in blue), conducted a forecast study
of the economic impact of the introduction of ASF. The remaining 57 countries (including Brazil, Chile, Italy and Russia) did not conduct any
simulated economic studies and are shaded in light green. (6) Among tercile 3X (57 countries), 54 (including Argentina, Australia, Canada,
Russia and most of Europe) did not conduct any prospective economic analysis and are shaded in bright green. Three countries (Denmark,
Spain and the United States), shaded in dark green, conducted one forecast study each, and no country conducted more than one forecast
study overall [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

between the potential impact on the economy of an ASF intro-

57 countries with the highest level of swine per capita, 8.8% have

duction and the number of forecasting analyses of the economic

conducted forecast studies.

impact of the disease.
Finally, regarding swine per capita and CSF forecast studies
(Figure 7), among the first and second tercile groups of swine per

3.2.2 | Other economic review results

capita for CSF studies, no forecast studies of the economic impact of an introduction of CSF were conducted. These countries

Another finding from the economic review was the lack of consist-

are shaded in light grey and light green, respectively. Fifty-seven

ency across studies in terms of the information describing data

countries were classified under tercile 3, where the number of

used in analyses. For example, definitions of economic terms were

swine per capita is the highest. Of those countries, 52 (91.2% of

found to be decidedly variable (see column ‘Economic estimation

tercile 3, including Argentina, China, Russia and the United States)

description’ in Tables A2, A3 and A4 in the Appendix). To high-

conducted no prospective economic analysis despite the poten-

light the discrepancies regarding economic definitions, we com-

tial impact to their economy. These countries are shaded in bright

pared WordCloud visuals (Jin, 2017) as a visual means to compare

green. Belgium, Denmark and Germany (shaded in dark green)

qualitative definitions of the quantitative studies. We used the

conducted one simulation, and Australia and the Netherlands

definitions of ‘total cost’ or ‘total loss’ as provided by each paper

(dark blue) both conducted two studies. This means that out of the

(column nine ‘Economic estimation description’ in Tables A2, A3
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F I G U R E 7 Number of head of livestock per capita (in terciles) and number of simulated economic studies for CSF. (1) The x-axis is the
same as in Figure 6. (2) The y-axis is grouped by number of peer-reviewed forecast economic studies for CSF by country. Group 1Y (tercile
1, bottom of y-axis) includes countries with zero studies, Group 2Y with 1 retrospective study, and Group 3Y included with more than one
forecast study. (3) For 1X and 2X, no forecast studies of the economic impact of an introduction of CSF were conducted. These countries
are shaded in light grey and light green, respectively. (4) Among the 3X countries, 54 (including Argentina, China, Russia and the United
States) did not conduct any prospective economic analysis. These countries are shaded in bright green. Three countries (Belgium, Denmark
and Germany), shaded in dark green, conducted one simulation, and Australia and the Netherlands both conducted two studies and are
shaded in dark blue [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

and A4 in the Appendix). It was found that not every study in-

varying diseases, methodologies and results make it difficult to draw

cluded the terms ‘costs’, ‘losses’, or an aggregate definition of

general conclusions across studies. Lastly, one smaller but decidedly

these two terms. The term ‘cost’ more often alluded to outbreak

important takeaway from the review of economic literature was that

response costs (often referred to as ‘direct’ costs) like ‘vaccina-

some studies did not explicitly provide the year of reference for the

tion’, ‘cleaning’ and ‘disinfection’. Other notable descriptors in-

currency values presented. This information is a simple detail which

cluded ‘government’ and ‘compensation’ or ‘indemnity’. The term

should always be clear in publications for ease of future use such as

‘loss’ more often related to agricultural production and included

inflation calculations.

words like, ‘milk’, ‘production’, ‘death’ (related to animal deaths)
and ‘industry’. Other notable descriptors included ‘government’,
‘economic’ and ‘financial’. Most obvious was that ‘cost’ includes

4 | D I S CU S S I O N

losses and ‘loss’ includes costs, which is to be expected but convolutes the differentiation between cost and losses. Finally, words

These two scoping literature reviews originally aimed at simulta-

associated with outbreak response costs like ‘disinfection’ and

neously elucidating the most likely route of introduction and the

‘vaccination’ are found in the ‘loss’ definitions, and words associ-

associated economic impact associated with ASF, CSF and FMD.

ated with agricultural production such as ‘export loss’ and ‘cattle

We were optimistic that a thorough review of the literature would

industry’ are found in the ‘cost’ definitions.

implicate a ‘smoking gun’ that could be used as a starting point for

These comparisons qualitatively suggest that there are inconsis-

further risk analyses and as a policy and decision making tool to

tencies in the definitions of economic ‘cost’ and ‘loss’ across studies.

prevent and prepare for a foreign animal disease (FAD) introduc-

While no statistical analysis was carried out, these figures illustrate

tion. While this was not the outcome, we were able to extrapolate

the variability in parameters used to define cost and loss measures

some useful results and develop a guide to key future research

across studies. These results reiterate Perry & Grace (2009) that

endeavours.
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In reviewing all risk evaluation literature, we cannot definitively

case of an outbreak. Fifth, in addition to some oversight in including

identify the most likely route of introduction by specific region or

important details like relevant currency and reference years for eco-

disease. However, the majority of foreign risk evaluations that iden-

nomic values, there was a stark difference between what economic

tified a specific pathway of introduction specified legal and illegal

estimates like ‘cost’ and ‘loss’ were comprised of. Lastly, these re-

importations of live animals, animal products, animal feed, genetic

views have not considered the potential role of feral swine in per-

material and bioterrorism; these results were reinforced by the U.S.-

petuating and amplifying the spread of these diseases in the United

specific risk evaluations.

States. Feral swine may be a significant variable relative to foreign

Further, our review of the economic literature highlights that

animal diseases and could play a critical role in the potential eco-

there were not any systematic retrospective economic analyses of

nomic impact associated with an outbreak event. Without at least a

the historic outbreaks, and too few simulations in the countries that

qualitative examination of the potential role of these invasive mam-

are currently the most at risk for economic harm. This void makes

mals, these reviews lack a crucial element in understanding the risk

preparation, preparedness and future planning challenging.

and certainly the economic impact. These six points leave govern-

Taken together, the synergies of these two reviews tell us more

ments and institutions without tools to assess the cost effectiveness

about how any one of these diseases may enter the United States,

of different mitigation strategies in the case of an outbreak resulting

but still very little about which disease is most likely to cause the

in potentially devastating consequences to the U.S.

greatest economic harm. In the United States, only one prospective study has been carried out for ASF and none for CSF, rendering it impossible to compare the outcomes. While numerous

4.1 | Disease risks in the United States

prospective economic studies have been published for the three
FADs (primarily for European countries), we are unable to infer

The introduction of any of these diseases has the capacity to quickly

any meaningful conclusions for the United States, due to regional

impact the United States livestock industry, and the potential eco-

specificity and a myriad of disparate methodologies. Anecdotally,

nomic costs for a multispecies pathogen (i.e. FMDV) would be ex-

among the risk evaluation studies that analysed pathways of in-

pected to be even larger. According to the 2017 U.S. Census of

troduction related to a specific disease, ASFV was the most stud-

Agriculture, the 2017 value of livestock production in the United

ied pathogen, which could indicate that this pathogen is the most

States alone was $77.2 billion USD, $26.3 billion USD and $36.7 bil-

concerning with respect to an incursion event. However, by a sub-

lion USD for cattle and calves, hogs and pigs, and milk, respectively

stantial margin, FMD has the largest number of economic impact

(USDA, 2019a). In recent years, the United States has been either

studies. It is important to note that this relationship may be a relic

the world's largest or second largest exporter of pork and pork prod-

of the temporality of disease outbreaks (e.g. the global spread of

ucts and is the third-largest producer and consumer of pork and pork

ASFV since 2018).

products globally (USDA, 2019b) with just under 200 million head

Our intention in undertaking this project is that we would use
U.S. literature to guide our understanding of introduction risk and

sold (USDA, 2019a). In 2018, the United States was the fourth largest exporter of beef (USDA, 2019b, 2019c).

economic impact; however, the paucity of research on these topics

In addition to the economic impacts associated with an outbreak

compelled us to utilize all existing data globally. Conducting these

of ASF, CSF or FMD, the United States is home to at least six million

reviews in tandem demonstrated substantial gaps in knowledge;

invasive feral swine that roam in the majority of U.S. states (Lewis

however, it led to some additional broad generalizations regarding

et al., 2019; USDA, 2020). Feral swine pose a threat to domestic

the potential impact of these diseases to the United States. First,

livestock due to their high densities, rapid reproductive rate, and

there was not uniform consensus among the risk analyses for the po-

omnivorous and opportunistic diet (Brown et al., 2018) Additionally,

tential disease introduction point or points within the United States.

anthropogenic activities (e.g. baiting, translocation and hunting

Second, while it is clear all of these diseases can cause significant

pressures) and interaction with domestic livestock make feral swine

economic harm, the variation in economic scope, definitions and

an optimal vector for foreign and domestic animal disease spread.

data sources makes it difficult to aggregate economic study results

In some instances, feral swine live in urban and peri-urban environ-

for continent-wide or even global research. Third, our review pointed

ments and have been documented to feed in landfills. While there

to a lack of correlation between the number of disease outbreaks

was not uniform consensus in the literature related to route of

and corresponding retrospective economic analyses, highlighting

pathogen incursion, legal and illegal imports of animals and animal

either a lack of data collection on previous outbreaks or a lack of

products were considered in some assessments to be the highest

motivation to publish such data. Fourth, despite the potentially large

risk pathway of introduction, most commonly via air passengers

impact of an introduction of ASF, CSF or FMD on large sectors of the

or air passenger baggage (Brown & Bevins, 2018a, 2018b, 2019).

economy, few prospective (forecasting) economic studies have been

Introduction via other fomites such as shoes, clothing and supplies

peer-reviewed and published, leaving researchers and practitioners

was one of the least common risks. Feral swine foraging at a landfill

(including governments and institutions) without data or results to

containing contaminated products could serve as an additional po-

assess the cost effectiveness of different mitigation strategies in the

tential route for viral introduction and spillover.
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The paucity of information available on the highest risk and highest consequence routes for ASFV, CSFV and FMDV is problematic
relative to developing targeted preventative methods, performing
economic analyses for control methods and minimizing damage to
related industries. Indeed, Buhnerkempe et al. (2014) showed that
epidemic behaviour is strongly dependent on the introduction site
of the pathogen. Insight for control and surveillance could be gained
through an understanding of the most likely routes of introduction
and the heterogeneity in disease spread processes that create the
variation in outbreak sizes and corollary economic impacts, which is
crucial for targeted preventative measures and resource allocation.

5 | DATA AVA I L A B I LIT Y S TATE M E NT S
These reviews were based on the methodological guidance outlined by Peters et al. (2015) [29] and utilized the PRISMA methods (Preferred Reporting Items of Systematic Reviews and
Meta-Analyses) [30, 31] for systematic scoping reviews. Specific
text evaluated, search terms, and exclusion criteria, based on each
PRISMA step are outlined for the risk assessment and economic literature reviews (respectively) in Table 1.
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APPENDIX
TA B L E A 1

Description of included studies of risk evaluations

Authors & date

Pathogen

Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

ASFV

Qualitative

Not identified

U.S. Assessments
Blackwell
et al. (1985)
USDA (1995)

Feeding garbage to livestock, international trade of food
products of animal origin

ASFV

Quantitative

Feeding household waste contaminated by contraband or
legal imports to domestic swine

Corso (1997)

ASFV

Quantitative

Contraband contaminated household waste being fed to
domestic swine

Uncooked swill, (Due to legal/illegal importation of food items Uncooked contaminated swill feeding
of animal origin by way of traveller or by mail, subsequently
discarded in household waste)

USDA (2014a)

ASFV

Qualitative

Dietary supplements/traditional medicines, veterinary

Diagnostic samples collected from swine or ruminants

vaccines and miscellaneous biological products,
unprocessed animal feed ingredients derived from plants
or plant products, commercial swine meat and meat (by)
products for human consumption, non-rendered pet food
treats and chews, bushmeat, non-regulated garbage,
livestock and germplasm, humans, other live animals,
airborne, inanimate articles that may serve as fomites,
vehicular fomites, equipment, garbage (every possible
pathway)
Chen and Jiang

ASFV

Qualitative

Animal waste in manure

Not identified

ASFV

Quantitative

Legal importation of swine and swine products

Legal importations of live pigs

ASFV

Qualitative

Illegal/legal movement/importation of live animals or their

Illegal/legal movement of live animals or their products,

(2017)
Herrera-Ibatá
et al. (2017)
Brown and Bevins
(2018b)
Dee et al. (2018)

products, by-products, or animal feed or bioterrorism
ASFV

Golnar et al. (2019) ASFV

by-products, or animal feed or bioterrorism

Quantitative

Importation of feed ingredients

Not identified

Semi-

Soft ticks, domestic pigs, bushpigs, warthogs

Ornithodoros coriaceus (highest risk soft tick in those

quantitative

evaluated)

Jurado et al. (2019) ASFV

Quantitative

Swine products carried by air passengers

Not identified

Wormington

ASFV

Qualitative

Sylvatic establishment and spillover to domestic swine

Not identified

CSFV

Qualitative

Feeding garbage to livestock, international trade of food

Not identified

et al. (2019)
Blackwell
et al. (1985)
Corso (1997)

products of animal origin
CSFV

Quantitative

Uncooked swill (due to legal/illegal importation of food items

Uncooked contaminated swill feeding

of animal origin by way of traveller or by mail, which is then
discarded in household waste)
USDA (1998a)

CSFV

Qualitative

Imported infected pork and/or pork products either discarded Illegal importation of pork/pork products via airline
as household waste and deposited in landfill or fed to

passengers

backyard pig herd
USDA (1998b)

CSFV

Both

Legal importation of fresh, chilled and frozen pork; import of

Not explicitly stated; however data implies import of

breeding animals (boars and gilts); and imports of fresh and

breeding boars (very high cost scenario), import of

frozen semen

fresh, chilled and frozen pork (low cost scenario),
import of fresh and frozen semen (low, moderate high
and very high cost scenarios)
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Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

Highest risk geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Foreign countries

Not identified

United States

Puerto Rico

Not identified

Scenario event trees with nesting
binomial probability formulas

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

Nested binomial model and
Monte Carlo modelling

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Worldwide

Canada (for live swine

United States

Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin Not identified

pathway)
North America, Africa,

Africa, Asia, Europe

Stochastic

(for live swine pathway)
United States

Not identified

Spread and persistence of

N/A

disease

Asia, South America,
Australia, Europe
China (Trans-Pacific), and Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Ghana, Cape Verde,

United States

Main airports in Virginia, New

Not identified

Quantitative stochastic models

the Caucasus, Eastern
Europe, the Baltic
states (Trans-Atlantic)
Ornithodoros coriaceus
(highest risk soft tick in
those evaluated)
Foreign countries

Not identified

Ethiopia, Russian

York, Texas, Rhode Island,

Federation

Puerto Rico

Not identified

United States

Counties of California, Florida

for each disease
Not identified

Spatial

and ‘much of the Southwestern United States’
Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not Identified

Nested binomial model and
Monte Carlo modelling

Dominican Republic

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

European Union

Not identified

United States

Texas or Florida

Import of infected

Net Trade Model (Partial

breeding boars (very high

Equilibrium Welfare Model also

cost scenario)

mentioned as being used to
model impacts of disease on US)

(Continues)
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(Continued)

Authors & date

Pathogen

Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

USDA (1998c)

CSFV

Both

Not identified

Legal importation of fresh, chilled and frozen pork; import of
breeding animals (boars and gilts); and imports of fresh and
frozen semen

USDA (1998d)

CSFV

Both

Importation of pork

Not identified

USDA (1999)

CSFV

Both

Unmitigated importation of swine semen; fresh, chilled and

Not explicitly identified, although swine semen model

frozen pork (and subsequent feeding of food waste to pigs);

appeared to have the highest expected frequency

and breeding swine

under unmitigated conditions (within the ‘most likely’
output category)

USDA (1998e)

CSFV

Both

Unmitigated importation of swine semen; fresh, chilled and

Not explicitly identified, although swine semen model

frozen pork (and subsequent feeding of food waste to pigs);

appeared to have the highest expected frequency

and breeding swine

under unmitigated conditions (within the ‘most likely’
output category)

Dietrich and

CSFV

Quantitative

Adams (2000)

Legal and illegal importation of food products via garbage or

Not identified

waste feeding operations; contact of domestic swine with
feral hogs exposed through contaminated food dropped in
areas frequented by feral hogs

USDA (2000)

CSFV

Both

Movement of domestic animals, transmission from wild boars, Contaminated swine semen
distribution of contaminated swine semen, distribution of
fresh/frozen pork, and movement of contaminated people,
vehicles or equipment

USDA (2002)

CSFV

Qualitative

Not identified

Not identified

NABC (2004)

CSFV

Qualitative

Live swine, hog products industry related products (e.g.

Importation of infected swine products (legal and illegal)

feed and farm equipment) and humans. Also discusses wild
boar and domestic swine direct/indirect contact; feeding
of unsanitized garbage to swine; javelina and pet pigs as
pathways/maintenance factors

USDA (2014a)

CSFV

Qualitative

Dietary supplements/traditional medicines, veterinary

Diagnostic samples collected from swine or ruminants

vaccines and miscellaneous biological products,
unprocessed animal feed ingredients derived from plants
or plant products, commercial swine meat and meat (by)
products for human consumption, non-render
Chen and Jiang

CSFV

Qualitative

Animal waste in manure

Not identified

CSFV

Quantitative

Legal importation of swine and swine products

Legal importation of live pigs

CSFV

Quantitative

Importation of feed ingredients

Not identified

(2017)
Herrera-Ibatá
et al. (2017)
Dee et al. (2018)
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Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

United States

Not identified

Not identified

Net Trade Model

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

Stochastic (nested probability

Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Not identified

Highest risk geographic

Belgium-Luxembourg,
Portugal, Germany,
Denmark, Austria,
France
European Union (with
specific attention
to Germany, the
Netherlands, Italy and
Spain)
European Union

approach)

European Union

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not explicitly identified,

Stochastic (nested probability

although unmitigated

approach) for Biological Risk

swine semen model

Analysis; economic values

generated the lowest

determined through estimation,

NPV value (indicating the

not modelling

costs associated with this
pathway are higher than
any benefits of trade)
Not identified

Not identified

Southern United

Not identified

Scenario 2; introduction

States (Alabama,

of CSFV into 3

Arkansas,

geographically separated

Florida, Georgia,

regions

Agricultural Sector Model (linear
programming model)

Louisiana,
Mississippi,
North Carolina,
South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas)
European Union

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

Multi-level binomial

Not identified

Dominican Republic

United States

Puerto Rico

Not identified

N/A

Worldwide

United Kingdom (for

United States

Puerto Rico, South-eastern

Texas

Trading grid (to describe

live swine); United

United States (for illegal

movement of live swine and

Kingdom, Germany,

movement of pigs and pig

swine products and relate to the

Italy (for pig meat);

products)

occurrence of CSFV worldwide);

Dominican Republic

also survey of experts and swine

and the Caribbean

producers

(for illegal pigs/pig
products)
Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Worldwide

Canada (for live swine

United States

Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin Not identified

pathway)
China (Trans-Pacific), and Not identified

Stochastic

(for live swine pathway)
United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

the Caucasus, Eastern
Europe, the Baltic
states (Trans-Atlantic)

(Continues)
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Authors & date

Pathogen

Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

Jurado et al. (2019) CSFV

Quantitative

Swine products carried by air passengers

Not identified

Blackwell

Qualitative

Feeding garbage to livestock, international trade of food

Not identified

FMDV

et al. (1985)

products of animal origin

USDA (1994)

FMDV

Qualitative

Import of infected live animals, contaminated animal products Not identified

USDA (1995)

FMDV

Quantitative

Feeding household waste contaminated by contraband or

and fomites
legal imports to domestic swine
Corso (1997)

FMDV

Quantitative

Uncooked swill (due to legal/illegal importation of food items

Contraband contaminated household waste being fed to
domestic swine
Uncooked contaminated swill feeding

of animal origin by way of traveller or by mail, which is then
discarded in household waste)
CEAH (2001)

FMDV

Qualitative

Contraband, illegal trans-shipments, garbage, animal
products, human movements from foreign countries, live

Contraband (meat products carried by passengers/in
cargo containers/sent by mail/FedEx, black market)

animals, animal germplasm, military movements
Federal Inter-

FMDV

Qualitative

Importation of infected animals or contaminated animal
products

agency Working

Contraband from international passengers, cargo, mail
and vehicles

Group (2003)
Breeze (2004)

FMDV

Qualitative

Agroterrorism

Not identified

USDA (2007)

FMDV

Qualitative

Meat, meat products or garbage feeding pathways; livestock

Not identified; results of this analysis reported the

importations

hazard ranking (low, moderate or high) of potential
sources including animals, animal products and fomites.
Of 99 animals identified as possible FMDV sources, 31
categorized as high hazards (Antelope, African buffalo,
domestic cattle, mountain gazelle, impala, goat, sheep,
alpaca, Bactrian camel, llama, fallow deer, mule deer,
muntjac deer, red deer, roe deer, sika deer, white-tailed
deer, domestic pig, fox human, capybara, coypu, rat,
grey kangaroo, red kangaroo, tree kangaroo, hedgehog,
starling, house fly, biting fly, tick). Of 97 animal
products/other fomites identified, 53 categorized
as high hazards (hides/skins, bovine manure, bovine
pituitary extract, bovine semen, sheep wool, bacon,
whole beef, bovine blood, bovine bone marrow, porcine
bone marrow, cultured butter, buttermilk, bovine dried
casein, ham, sheep intestinal casings, swine intestinal
casings, bovine lymph node, porcine lymph node,
bovine milk, pork muscle, bovine rumen, dry sausage,
bovine tongue. *See tables for details on product
processing). Of 15 non-food products identified, 12
were categorized as high hazard (straw/wood shaving
bedding, clothing, feed and fodder, garbage, packing/
wrapping materials, shoes/boots, autumn/winter soil,
vegetables, water)

USDA (2012)

FMDV

Qualitative

Legal and illegal import of contaminated products, fomites,

Legal and illegal imports

USDA (2013)

FMDV

Qualitative

Importation of beef products

Feeding contaminated food waste to swine

Slingluff

FMDV

Both

Movement of infected carcasses (swine and cattle) during an

Not identified

infected animals or animal products

et al. (2014)
USDA (2014a)

outbreak
FMDV

Qualitative

Import of infected live animals, infected embryos and semen,
and contaminated sheep meat

Not identified
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Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

Highest risk geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

Foreign countries

Dominican Republic,

United States

Main airports in Puerto Rico,

Not identified

Quantitative stochastic models

followed by Cuba

for each disease

Florida, North Carolina, New
Jersey, Ohio

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Countries with past

Not identified

North America

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Foreign countries

Not identified

United States

Puerto Rico

Not identified

Scenario event trees with nesting

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

Nested binomial model and

outbreaks
binomial probability formulas
Monte Carlo modelling
Worldwide

Not identified

United States

United States swine waste

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

N/A

feeding operations (Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands
have the most)
Not identified

Not identified

United States

Areas most densely populated
with livestock in the United
States (see map 2 page 10)

Worldwide

Not identified

United States

Midwest (for swine); Midwest
and Southwest states (for
feedlot cattle)

Countries with past

Not identified

North America

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

United States

Texas

Not identified

N/A

Brazil

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

United States

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

Within herd stochastic disease

outbreaks

Infected countries,
Canada and Mexico

spread model
Argentina

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A
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Pathogen

Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

USDA (2014b)

FMDV

Qualitative

Diagnostic samples collected from swine or ruminants

Dietary supplements/traditional medicines, veterinary
vaccines and miscellaneous biological products,
unprocessed animal feed ingredients derived from plants
or plant products, commercial swine meat and meat (by)
products for human consumption, non-render

USDA (2018)

FMDV

Both

Feeding livestock contaminated ready-to-eat pork products

Not identified

Chen and Jiang

FMDV

Qualitative

Animal waste in manure

Not identified

Dee et al. (2018)

FMDV

Quantitative

Importation of feed ingredients

Not identified

Bair-Brake

Not

Both

Bushmeat importation

Not identified

MacDiarmid (1991) ASFV

Qualitative

Importation of meat and meat products

Not identified

CFIA (1999)

ASFV

Both

Salted intestinal casings fed to domestic pigs (legally or

Salted intestinal casings fed to wild pigs

Adkin et al. (2004)

ASFV

Quantitative

Illegally imported meat and meat products and imported

(2017)

et al. (2014)

identified

Foreign assessments

illegally imported)
catering waste (e.g. ship and aircraft waste)

Imports of de-boned meat via air-passenger baggage
most likely to cause subsequent livestock infection
after being introduced

Gale (2004)

ASFV

Quantitative

Composted catering waste containing uncooked meat
discarded on farm land or fed to animals

Wooldridge

ASFV

Quantitative

et al. (2006)
Sánchez-Vizcaíno

De-boned meat, and meat that follows human carriage (litter,

Composted uncooked animal waste being fed to farm
animals or distributed near them

Illegal importation of meat by way of passenger baggage

'fly-tipping', direct feeding)
ASFV

Qualitative

Tick bites and movement of infected pigs

Free-ranging pigs

et al. (2009)

DEFRA (2008)

ASFV

Qualitative

Import of animal products

Not identified

Beltrán-Alcrudo

ASFV

Qualitative

Wild boar, vectors (e.g. ticks), pork and pork products

Not identified

et al. (2008)

imported and swill feed to domestic swine or accessed by
wild boar

Costard

ASFV

Quantitative

Animal-contact, person- and vehicle-contact, feeding

Not identified

ASFV

Qualitative

Legal/illegal importation of pig products, direct and indirect

Oral consumption of illegally imported pig products by

et al. (2009)
Hartley (2010)

contact between feral swine and livestock (airborne, faecooral, food borne, vector borne), import or translocation of
feral swine

domestic pigs
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Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

Highest risk geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

United States

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

Within herd stochastic disease
spread model

Not identified

Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

China (Trans-Pacific), and Not identified

United States

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

the Caucasus, Eastern
Europe, the Baltic
states (Trans-Atlantic)
Not identified

West Africa

United States

Not identified

Not Identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

New Zealand

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Canada

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Non-EU countries

Eastern Africa

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

Stochastic

United Kingdom

Not identified

United Kingdom

Not identified

Multiple farm animals

Source-pathway-receptor

eating bits of the same

approach

contaminated waste,
rather than one single
pig eating all of the
contaminated portion of
waste
Worldwide

Eastern Africa

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

Common structure model

Europe and Africa

Not identified

Europe and Africa

Not identified

Not identified

This document is more of a
scientific and pathobiology
review rather than a risk
assessment. It states that the
exponential intensification of
animal movements and product
exchanges enhances the risk
of ASFV introduction in a free
country

Non-EU countries

Not identified

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Caucasus region

Not identified

Turkey, Iran,

Russian Federation and Ukraine Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Multiple factor analysis and

Russian
Federation,
Ukraine
Not identified

Not identified

Madagascar

Not identified

hierarchical cluster analysis
Not identified

Not identified

England

Not identified

Introduction into wild boar N/A
population/spread and
duration of the disease
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Pathogen

Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

Wieland

ASFV

Qualitative

Not identified

et al. (2011)

Domestic pigs: direct contact between pigs, indirect
contact between pork products and pigs, contaminated
feed, fomites, mechanical vectors (pets and pests), ticks,
contamination of environment which spills over in wild
boar and tick population. Wild Boar: direct contact, indirect
contact through hunting or contaminated environment

Mur, Martínez-

ASFV

Quantitative

Importation of an ASF-infected (but non-detected) pig during Importation of infected live pigs
the high risk period, subsequent contact with susceptible pig

López,
Martínez-Avilés,
et al. (2012)
Mur et al. (2012)

ASFV

Semiquantitative

Returning livestock trucks from affected areas, waste from

Returning livestock vehicles (trucks)

international ships and waste from international planes

Nigsch et al. (2013) ASFV

Both

Pig to pig contact; pig transport lorries; professional contacts

Not identified

Costard

Semi-

Illegal importation of pork and pork products via personal

Illegal importation by EU residents originally from ASFV

ASFV

et al. (2013)

Cardoso de

quantitative

ASFV

Qualitative

Transmission between individuals within the same group,

affected areas

Not identified

between different groups/individuals on different farms,

Carvalho Ferreira

and via tick vectors

(2013)
Mur et al. (2014)

consumption purposes and commercial/re-sale purposes

ASFV

Both

Legal importations of pigs, legal/illegal imports of products,

Highest risk route depended on pathway and EU

transportation fomites (including contaminated trucks or

member-state. Bulgaria highest risk for legally imported

waste from international planes and ships) and wild boar

products during the high risk period; Finland highest

movements

risk for wild boar movement route; Slovenia and
Sweden for legally imported pigs during the high risk
period

EFSA Panel on

ASFV

Qualitative

Movement of contaminated pork, movement of infected pigs, Chilled meat; transported wild boar; transported
movement of contaminated vehicles

Animal Health

domestic swine; skin fat; vehicles for animal transportcontaminated inside

and Welfare
(2014)
Roelandt

ASFV

et al. (2017)
Martínez-López

Semi-

Not identified

Not identified

quantitative
ASFV

Quantitative

Not identified

Not identified

ASFV

Semi-

Infected wild boars; contact with uninfected swine (wild and

Not identified

et al. (2015)
Torre et al. (2015)

quantitative
Bellini et al. (2016)

ASFV

Qualitative

domestic)
Direct pig-to-pig contact, contaminated feed (swill feeding),

Not identified

workers visitors, contaminated fomites, slurry, genetic
materials and tick bites
Dejyong (2016)

ASFV

Qualitative

Legal and illegal import of live pigs, pig products, pig semen
and embryos, wild boars, wild boar meat, biological

Shipment of pig products (frozen meat considered very
high risk)

products, potbellied pigs and personal items
CFSPH (2016)

ASFV

Quantitative

Feeding of food waste from international airplanes or

Not identified

ships from countries where disease is found, feral swine
movements, movement of trucks between infected and
disease-free areas, illegal movement of infected pigs or pork
products
Halasa, Boklund,
et al. (2016)),
Halasa, Bøtner,
et al. (2016))

ASFV

Quantitative

Dead animal (pig) residues: (blood, liquids and faeces), and
contact between pigs

Not identified
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Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

Highest risk geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

Not identified

Not identified

European Union

Germany, Northern France,

Not identified

Generic model

Not identified

Stochastic. Parameters

Central Italy (places with high
feral swine populations)

Albania, Canada,

Russian Federation

European Union

Poland

Switzerland, Norway,

individually defined using

Russian Federation,

various distributions (beta, pert,

United States, Australia,

normal and binomial)

Belarus
Russian Federation,

Not identified

European Union

Poland, Lithuania

Not identified

Linear-weighted

Germany and Poland

Not identified

Stochastic spatio-temporal state-

France, Germany, Italy, United

Spread of the disease:

Linear-weighted combination

Africa
European Union

Denmark, Netherlands, European Union
Lithuania, Latvia

Not identified

Not identified

transition model
European Union

Kingdom (high risk for release)

France, Italy, Poland,
Romania and Spain at
highest risk for exposure
after virus release

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Descriptive

Not identified

Not identified

European Union

Bulgaria- for legally imported

Not identified

Modular risk assessment
framework

products, Finland- for wild
boar, Slovenia & Swedenlegally imported pigs

Countries neighbouring

Georgia, Armenia

the European Union

and the Russian

European Union

Not identified

Not identified

Expert elicitation/matrix model

Belgium

Not identified

Introduction and spread in

Pandora risk assessment tool

Federation
Not identified

Not identified

domestic animals
Not identified

Not identified

Sardinia

Not identified

Not identified

Bayesian

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine,

Ukraine, Russia, Turkey European Union

Finland, Romania, Latvia, Poland Not identified

Stochastic

Not identified

Not identified

Europe

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Italy

Italy

Thailand

Thailand

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Sustained infectiousness

Dynamic Monte Carlo simulation

Moldova and Turkey

and disease spread

model
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1940

|

TA B L E A 1

BROWN et al.

(Continued)

Authors & date

Pathogen

Guinat et al. (2016) ASFV

Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

Qualitative

Not identified

Direct contact between infected and uninfected domestic
pigs, feeding domestic pigs contaminated feed, direct
contact between wild boar and domestic pigs, contaminated
fomites, ticks

Dione et al. (2016)

ASFV

Qualitative

Collection/bulking (live pig traders and brokers);

Live pig traders and transport of pig meat/materials

Transportation (live pig traders and transporters of pig
meat/materials); Slaughter (Backyard slaughters, authorized
slaughter slabs and the Wambizzi abattoir)
Huang et al. (2017) ASFV

Quantitative

Transmission by direct contact between humans, domestic
pigs, wild suids and ticks

Hwang et al. (2018) ASFV

Semiquantitative

Migration or natural movement of wildlife, International

West Africa- direct contact between domestic pigs or
pork products and pigs; East Africa- not identified
Migration or natural movement of wildlife, illegal

human movement, Illegal importation of wildlife and

importation of wildlife and wildlife parts, accidental

wildlife parts, Accidental introduction of disease vector,

introduction of a disease vector, smuggling of livestock

Smuggling of livestock products, legal importation of

products

wildlife and wildlife parts, Legal importation of livestock and
products, Importation of biological materials and pathogens,
Importation of vegetables and plant material, Bioterrorism
or the deliberate release of pathogens
Kyyrö et al. (2017)

ASFV

Semiquantitative

Sperm and embryos; contaminated feed and bedding

Products of animal origin (e.g. meat and meat products)

materials; contaminated animal transport vehicles operating
internationally; infected wild animals crossing the border;
movements of other contaminated goods and transport;
infected live animals; air stream and/or vectors; infected
meat and meat products; and people travelling from
diseased areas

Bosch et al. (2017)

ASFV

Semi-

Wild boar

Not identified

Infected wild boars coming into contact with uninfected wild

Natural movements of wild boar; domestic pig to

quantitative
Bosch, Rodríguez,

ASFV

et al. (2017)

Semiquantitative

or domestic swine

wild boar introduction; freshly harvested grass from
infected areas to low biosecurity farms

Anonymous (2017) ASFV

Qualitative

Movement of infected live animals, infected products or
contaminated equipment, vehicles, clothing and footwear,

Contaminated clothing, footwear, equipment and
vehicles; illegal movement of contaminated meat

subsequent contact with domestic or feral swine (including
wild boar)
DEFRA (2018)

ASFV

Qualitative

Legal/illegal trade of live animals, products of animal origin,

Illegal trade of products of animal origin, vehicles

clothing/footwear, boats, vehicles, crops seeds and feeds,
resulting in subsequent exposure to domestic or feral pigs

Sugiura and Haga
(2018)

ASFV

Qualitative

Legal/illegal importation/transportation of domestic pigs,
wild boar, feed, pork products, foreign workers

Illegal importation of food (pork products)

|

BROWN et al.

1941

Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

Highest risk geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

Not identified

Not identified

Europe

Not identified

Not identified

Literature review

Uganda

Not identified

Uganda

Not identified

Not identified

Ranked interview/group
discussion responses

Not identified

East and West Africa

East and West

East and West Africa

Not identified

Africa

Generalized linear mixed models
with a binary response (logic
link)

Not identified

Not identified

Republic of Korea

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Finland

Not identified

Not identified

NORA (developed for Finland)

Not identified

Not identified

Eurasia

Not identified

Not identified

Cartographic

Belarus, Estonia, Latvia,

Russian Federation and Disease-free

Slovakia, Romania, Finland,

Not identified

Stochastic

Lithuania, Moldova,

Ukraine, Lithuania,

European

Poland, Russia, Turkey,

Poland, Latvia,

Union countries

Ukraine

Estonia

(Bulgaria, Czech

Czech Republic, Germany

Republic, Finland,
Germany, Greece
Hungary, Romania
and Slovakia)
Not identified

Not identified

European Union

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Europe

Not identified

Economic impact, as well

OIE framework of release

as effect on community

(or entry), exposure and

cohesion and animal

consequence assessment

welfare; loss of public
confidence in pig industry
Africa (Burundi, Cape
Verde, Kenya, Mali,

China

Japan

Kanto and Kyushu

Spread and persistence of

Survey of experts' opinions

disease

South Africa, Uganda
Zimbabwe), Caucasus
(Moldova), East Europe
(Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland
Ukraine), Russian
Federation, West
Europe (Italy-Sardinia),
East Asia (China)
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Pathogen

Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

Jarvis (2018)

ASFV

Qualitative

Importation of swine, pork products and feed

Swill feeding and long-distance transport of pigs, along with
the use of spray-dried porcine plasma in feed

Middlemiss (2018)

ASFV

Qualitative

Movement of infected meat, meat products resulting

Personal import of meat products

in consumption by domestic swine or movement of
contaminated equipment/materials
Fekede

ASFV

et al. (2019)
DEFRA (2017)

Semi-

Infected wild boar contacting uninfected domestic swine

Infected wild boar

Legal and Illegal trade of live animals or animal products,

Trade of pig meat (fresh or frozen meat or untreated pig

quantitative
ASFV

Qualitative

contaminated fomites
Scientific

ASFV

Qualitative

Committee of the

in Belgian pig farms, dissemination between infected and

FASFC (2018)

non-infected pig farms

Jurado et al. (2018) ASFV

Qualitative

products)

Geographic spreading via wild boars, introduction and spread Wild boars (to other wild boars outside of introduction

Wild boar; biosecurity breaches on domestic pig farms

region of Luxemburg)

Swill feeding; pig-pig and/or pig-wild boar contact

(including movement of animals and semen/ova); swill
feeding; vectors; use of fresh fodder
Beltran-Alcrudo

ASFV

Qualitative

International trade animals and animals products, and fomites Not identified

MacDiarmid (1991) CSFV

Qualitative

Importation of meat and meat products

CFIA (1999)

CSFV

Not identified Salted intestinal casings fed to domestic pigs (legally or

Mintiens

CSFV

Quantitative

Neighbourhood infections

Not identified

Qualitative

Imports of genetic material (legal and illegal), returning

Animal movements, swill feeding and wild boar

et al. (2019)
Not identified
Salted intestinal casings fed to wild pigs

illegally imported)
et al. (2003)
DeVos et al. (2003) CSFV

livestock trucks, imports of wild animals, imports of batches
of domestic animals, illegal imports of live animals, imports
of animal products for human consumption, illegal imports
of animal products (including tourists), professional staff,
imports of manure, birds, pets, arthropods, and rodents, air
currents, laboratories, harbours and airports, and wildlife
Gale (2004)

CSFV

Quantitative

Composted catering waste containing uncooked meat
discarded on farm land or fed to animals

Adkin et al. (2004)

CSFV

Quantitative

Illegally imported meat and meat products and imported
catering waste (e.g. ship and aircraft waste)

Composted uncooked animal waste being fed to farm
animals or distributed near them

Imports of de-boned meat via air-passenger baggage
most likely to cause subsequent livestock infection
after being introduced

Vos et al. (2004)

CSFV

Quantitative

Importation of pigs and pork products, returning livestock

Returning livestock trucks

trucks, direct and indirect contact with wild boar, feeding of
improperly heated swill
DEFRA (2006)

CSFV

Qualitative

Importation of animal products

Not identified

Wooldridge

CSFV

Quantitative

Dried de-deboned meat, and meat that follows human

Illegal importation of meat by way of passenger baggage

DEFRA (2008)

CSFV

Qualitative

Importation of animal products

Not identified

Bronsvoort

CSFV

Quantitative

Importation of live swine, importation of swine semen,

Returning livestock trucks and legal meat imports

et al. (2006)

et al. (2008)

carriage (litter, 'fly-tipping', direct feeding)

returning livestock vehicles, legal importation of meat and
illegal importation of meats
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Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

Highest risk geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

Not identified

Not identified

United Kingdom

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

United Kingdom

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Northern China

Northern China

Infection of the Sino-

Spatial

Sino-Russia border; Sino- Sino-Russian border
Korean border

section

European Union

Romania

United Kingdom

United Kingdom

Not identified

N/A

Luxembourg province of

Not identified

Belgium (e.g.

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Literature review

Belgium

Russian border section

further spread
within country
from introduction
site of
Luxembourg)

Infected European Union Not identified
countries

Domestic farms
within Uninfected
European Union
countries

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

New Zealand

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Canada

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Belgium

Regions of Belgium (see map

Areas within Belgium

Logistic regression and spatial

Not identified

Pathway diagram and conceptual

in paper)
Not identified

Not identified

European Union

Southern Netherlands,

framework

Sudoldenburg Germany,
Hannover Germany, WestFlanders Belgium, Cotesd'Amor France

United Kingdom

Not identified

United Kingdom

Not identified

Multiple farm animals
eating bits of the same

Source-pathway-receptor
approach

contaminated waste,
rather than one single
pig eating all of the
contaminated portion of
waste
Non-EU countries

Western Africa

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

Stochastic

European Union

Germany, Belgium,

Netherlands

Netherlands

Not identified

Probability scenario tree

United Kingdom
Non-EU countries

Not identified

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Worldwide

Western Africa

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

Common structure model

Non-EU countries

Not identified

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

European Union

Germany, Netherlands

Denmark

Not identified

Not identified

Multi-level binomial

(Continues)
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Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

Costard

CSFV

Quantitative

Animal-contact, person- and vehicle-contact, feeding

Not identified

CSFV

Quantitative

Importation of infected domestic and wild swine

Importation of domestic swine

CSFV

Qualitative

Legal/illegal importation of pig products, direct and indirect

Oral consumption of illegally imported pig products by

et al. (2009)
Martínez-López
et al. (2009)
Hartley (2010)

contact between feral swine and livestock (airborne, faeco-

domestic pigs

oral, food borne, vector borne), import or translocation of
feral swine
Cardoso de

CSFV

Qualitative

CSFV

Both

Not identified

Movement of goods outside the EU; movements of wild

CSFV

Quantitative

Not identified

Not identified

Semi-

Migration or natural movement of wildlife, international

Migration or natural movement of wildlife, illegal

et al. (2017)
Gamado

Not identified

and via tick vectors

(2013)
Delgado

Transmission between individuals within the same group,
between different groups/individuals on different farms,

Carvalho Ferreira

boar, human contacts with wildlife and humans

et al. (2017)
Hwang et al. (2018) CSFV

quantitative

human movement, illegal importation of wildlife and wildlife

importation of wildlife and wildlife parts, accidental

parts, accidental introduction of disease vector, smuggling

introduction of a disease vector, smuggling of livestock

of livestock products, legal importation of wildlife and

products

wildlife parts
Beltran-Alcrudo

CSFV

Qualitative

International trade animals and animals products, and fomites Not identified

MacDiarmid (1991) FMDV

Qualitative

Importation of meat and meat products

Not identified

Forbes et al. (1994) FMDV

Both

legal and illegal importation of live animals and animal

Illegally imported meat products (5 year timeframe) or

et al. (2019)

products, terrorism, commercial passengers, vehicles and

terrorist/criminal intent (20 year timeframe)

equipment, waste disposal for sea and air transport

CFIA (1999)

FMDV

Not identified Salted intestinal casings fed to domestic pigs (legally or

Salted intestinal casings fed to wild pigs

illegally imported)
Moutou

FMDV

Qualitative

et al. (2001)

Importation or trade of animal and animal products, cross-

Not identified

border mingling of livestock herds, movement of infected
wildlife

Pharo and

FMDV

Qualitative

Illegally imported meat fed to pigs

Illegally imported meat fed to pigs

FMDV

Qualitative

Legally and illegally imported animals and animal products,

Illegally imported meat fed to pigs

Biosecurity
Authority (2002)
Pharo (2002)

fomites
DEFRA (2003)

FMDV

Both

Illegal importation of meat and meat products

Personal baggage
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Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

Highest risk geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

Not identified

Not identified

Madagascar

Not identified

Not identified

Multiple factor analysis and

Countries that export

Netherlands, Germany, Spain

Lerida, Gerona, Huesca,

Not identified

Stochastic

hierarchical cluster analysis
products to Spain

Slovakia, Belgium

Barcelona and Zaragoza
provinces of Spain

Not identified

Not identified

England

Not identified

Introduction into wild boar N/A
population/spread and
duration of the disease

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Within and between group Descriptive
transmission

Not identified

Not identified

England, United

Not identified

Not identified

Network model

East Anglia, United Not identified

Not identified

Stochastic spatio-temporal

Kingdom
Not identified

Not identified

Kingdom

Susceptible-Infectious-Removed
(SIR) epidemic model

Not identified

Not identified

Republic of Korea

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

New Zealand

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Argentina, Brazil,

Thailand (for currently/ New Zealand

New Zealand

Not identified

Probability and stochastic

China, Columbia, East

recently infected)

Germany, India, Iran,

or Australia (for

Italy, Kenya, Nigeria,

non-infected)

simulation

Saudi Arabia, Soviet
Union, Thailand,
Turkey, West Germany
(currently or recently
infected countries
listed prior here) and
(non-infected countries
listed after here)
Australia, Chile, Egypt,
Fiji, France, Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco,
South Africa, Spain,
United Kingdom, USA
Not identified

Not identified

Canada

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Georgia, Armenia and

Not identified

Russia and Europe

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

New Zealand

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

New Zealand

Not identified

Not identified

Literature Review

Worldwide

Not identified

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

Probability with stochastic nature

Azerbaijan

(Continues)
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(Continued)

Authors & date

Pathogen

Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

Sutmoller and

FMDV

Qualitative

Not identified

Olascoaga (2003)

Importation of FMDV vaccinated live animals and animal
products from vaccinated animals (meat, meat products,
milk and dairy products, bovine embryos, semen

Adkin et al. (2004)

FMDV

Quantitative

Illegally imported meat and meat products and imported
catering waste (e.g. ship and aircraft waste)

Gale (2004)

FMDV

Quantitative

Composted catering waste containing uncooked meat
discarded on farm land or fed to animals

Schijven

FMDV

Quantitative

et al. (2005)

Illegal discharge of contaminated milk in sewerage resulting

Imports of cattle and pig meat via passenger baggage
pose highest risk to livestock infection
Composted uncooked animal waste being fed to farm
animals or distributed near them

Not identified

in livestock contact with contaminated surface water from
treatment plants

Hong et al. (2005)

FMDV

Quantitative

Contaminated smuggled animal products fed to swine

Feeding contaminated waste to susceptible swine

DEFRA (2006)

FMDV

Qualitative

Importation of animal products

Not identified

Wooldridge

FMDV

Quantitative

Cattle and pig meat, and meat that follows human carriage

Illegal importation of meat by way of passenger baggage

et al. (2006)
EFSA (2006)

(litter, 'fly-tipping', direct feeding)
FMDV

Qualitative

Legal and illegal importation of infected animals and

Illegally imported animal products

contaminated animal products, contaminated fomites (i.e.
trucks)
Hartnett

FMDV

Quantitative

Illegally imported contaminated meat

et al. (2007)

Illegal import of bone-in and dried de-boned products
from cattle and pigs in passenger baggage

DEFRA (2008)

FMDV

Quantitative

Importation of animal products

Not identified

Rodeia (2008)

FMDV

Qualitative

Not identified

Not identified

Bender

FMDV

Qualitative

Direct contact between animals, aerosol from infected

Not identified

et al. (2006)
Martínez-López

animals or milk trucks, fomites, artificial insemination
FMDV

Quantitative

Legal importation of live animals

Import of pigs

FMDV

Qualitative

Legal/illegal importation of pig products, direct and indirect

Oral consumption of illegally imported pig products by

et al. (2008)
Hartley (2010)

contact between feral swine and livestock (airborne, faeco-

domestic pigs

oral, food borne, vector borne), import or translocation of
feral swine
Wieland

FMDV

Qualitative

et al. (2015)

Livestock, animal-derived products, feed, vehicles/fomites,

Cross-border movement of livestock

people, wildlife, aerosol and water

Dewey et al. (2014) FMDV

Qualitative

Fomites (people, boots, vehicles, feed bags)

Not identified

Şenturk

Quantitative

Animal production chain aspects including input, processing,

Importation of animals

FMDV

et al. (2016)
Hernández-Jover
et al. (2016)

production, movement and marketing infrastructure
FMDV

Both

Illegal importation of infected meat

Direct feeding of infected meat to pigs at small-scale
piggeries
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Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

Highest risk geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Countries outside the

Near and Middle East

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

Stochastic

Not identified

United Kingdom

Not identified

Multiple farm animals

Source-pathway-receptor

European Union
United Kingdom

eating bits of the same

approach

contaminated waste,
rather than one single
pig eating all of the
contaminated portion of
waste
Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Dose-response model

Not identified

Not identified

South Korea

Not identified

Not identified

Monte Carlo Simulation

Non-EU countries

Not identified

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Worldwide

Near and Middle East

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

Common structure model

Infected non-EU

Southeast Asia, China,

European Union

Europe

Introduction of infected

N/A

countries
Eastern Asia, Near and
Middle East, Eastern

South Asia
Near and Middle East

live animal
Great Britain

Great Britain

Not identified

region

Object-oriented simulation of
flow, probability, Monte Carlo
simulation

Europe, Southern
Africa, Western
Africa, North America,
Caribbean, Southern
Asia, Eastern Africa,
Oceania, Central and
South America, Southeastern Asia, Northern
Africa, Central Africa
Non-EU countries

Not identified

Great Britain

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Southeast Asia, China,

European Union

Europe

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

European Union

Not identified

Spain

North-eastern Spain

Not identified

Binomial probability, Monte Carlo

Not identified

Not identified

England

Not identified

Introduction into wild boar N/A

South Asia

approach
population/spread and
duration of the disease
Mongolia

Mongolia (eastern

Mongolia

Mongolia (western region)

Not identified

N/A

Canada (Ontario)

Not identified

Not identified

Focus groups and interviews of

region)
Canada (Ontario)

Not identified

feed-company personnel and
swine producers
Not identified

Not identified

Turkey (Samsun

Not identified

Not identified

Linear regression

Not identified

Not identified

Scenario trees and Monte Carlo

Province)
Not identified

Not identified

Australia

stochastic simulation

(Continues)
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(Continued)

Authors & date

Pathogen

Type of study Assessed pathways of introduction

Highest risk pathway of introduction

DEFRA (2017)

FMDV

Both

Meat and dairy products

Commercial and personal importations of products of animal
origin; live animals commercial and personal imports and the
EU Pet Travel Scheme; commercial and personal imports of
plant and plant products (including wood, wood products
and bark); veterinary medicines (commercial and personal
import of illegal veterinary medicines)

Delgado

FMDV

et al. (2017)

Semiquantitative

Legal and illegal movements of animals and animal products,
and airborne transmission

Legal, non-commercial movement of people and goods
across and within borders of live animals and animal
products

Goldsmith

FMDV

Qualitative

Not identified

Not identified

FMDV

Qualitative

International trade animals and animals products, and fomites Not identified

Not

Quantitative

Importations of animal materials by mail or air passengers

Animal products imported by air passengers

Quantitative

Illegal importation of animal products by air passenger

Not identified

et al. (2017)
Beltran-Alcrudo
et al. (2019)
Davidson (1992)

identified
Shih et al. (2005)

Not
identified

Whyte (2006)

Not

baggage
Qualitative

identified
Chaber
et al. (2010)
Noordhuizen
et al. (2013)
Falk et al. (2013)

Not

in passenger baggage and sent in the mail)
Qualitative

Illegally imported bushmeat by air passenger

Not identified

Qualitative

Illegal importation of animals and animal products by

Not identified

identified
Not
identified
Not

travellers
Qualitative

identified
Porphyre
et al. (2014)
Melo et al. (2014)

Legal and illegal imports (including infected materials brought Not identified

Not

Illegal importation of bushmeat and meat products by air

Not identified

passenger baggage
Both

Fomites and human mediated movement

Not identified

Quantitative

Illegal importation of animal products via air travel

Not identified

Qualitative

Illegally imported food by air passenger

Air passenger baggage

Both

Illegal importation of products of animal origin by air

Not identified

identified
Not
identified

Beutlich
et al. (2015)

Not
identified

Jansen et al. (2016) Not
identified

Melo et al. (2018)

Not
identified

passenger

Qualitative

Illegally imported food by air passenger

Illegally imported food by air passenger
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Assessed
Assessed geographic

Highest risk

geographic

Highest risk geographic

source

geographic source

destination

destination

Highest risk consequence

Model

Worldwide

Passengers returning

United Kingdom

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

United Kingdom

United Kingdom

Not identified

Systemic model

from Southern and
Eastern Asia, Near
and Middle East, and
West Africa
Non-EU trading

European Union and

partners/countries,

trading partners with

EU member countries

FMDV outbreaks

with confirmed
FMDV outbreaks and
laboratories
Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

Not identified

New Zealand

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Worldwide

China and Hong Kong

Taiwan

CKS International Airport

Not identified

Monte Carlo Simulation

Not identified

Not identified

New Zealand

New Zealand

Not identified

N/A

Sub-Saharan Africa

Central African

France

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Republic, Cameroon,
Republic of Congo
Worldwide

Not identified

European Union

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Worldwide

Kosovo

Switzerland (Zurich Not identified

Not identified

Stochastic model

and Geneva
airports)
Scotland

Not identified

Scotland

Not identified

Not identified

External-Internal Index

Worldwide

Eastern Europe,

Brazil

Not identified

Not identified

Chi square, logistic regression and

Portugal

odds ratios

Worldwide

Turkey and Russia

Germany

Not identified

Not identified

N/A

Worldwide

Meat- Russia and the

Germany

International airports

Not identified

N/A

Not identified

N/A

Caucasus, DairyTurkey and Middle
East
Worldwide

China

Brazil - GRU/SBGR Not identified
Airport

Forecast
(BCA)

Forecast
(BCA)

Retrospective
(BCA)

Retrospective
(BCA)

Forecast (PEA)

Forecast
(BCA)

Halasa, Boklund,
et al. (2016)),
Halasa, Bøtner,
et al. (2016))

Fasina
et al. (2012)

Babalobi
et al. (2007)

Babalobi
et al. (2007)

Rendleman and
Spinelli (1999)

Bech-Nielsen
et al. (1993)

ASF study

Retro./For.
analysis?
(economic
approacha )

1992

1993

2001

2001

2011

2016

Yearb

20 years
(program
duration)

10 years
(program
duration)

1 year

1 year

3 years

1–29 days

Duration

Europe

North
America

Africa

Africa

Africa

Europe

Continent

Spain

USA

Nigeria

Nigeria

Nigeria

Denmark

Country

TABLE A2 Global economic impact estimates of African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks

$94,539,870,064

$5,930,039,264

$142,477,345

$1,350,836

$649,000

$435,531,250

Cost estimate
(2019 USDc )

Total loss

Total cost

Total cost

Total loss

Total average
annual loss

Total median
cost + loss

Economic
Measure

Economic loss: value of swine
depopulated

Prevention and cleanup costs

Direct costs for farm
biosecurity against outbreak
(carcass disposal, quarantine
animal entering the herds,
buying only from herds
with trusted animal health
program, testing for ASF)

Financial losses from pig
mortality defined as 'total
mortality cost'

Production loss Sum of 3
annual totals given in paper

Direct costs (surveillance
costs, depopulation costs,
cleaning and disinfection,
compensation, empty stables,
welfare slaughter, 3 days
national standstill) + export
loss

Economic estimation
description

|
(Continues)

Direct costs: producers and
government Indirect loss:
export loss

Estimated program costs for
outbreak of ASF in U.S. Costs
include: an indemnity portion,
present value measure of
market prices paid for hogs
slaughtered throughout the
disease run, and a nonindemnity portion paid
throughout the run

Herd mortality distribution
in 306 farms affected by
outbreak, unit cost of testing
pigs for the presence of ASF in
Oyo State, Nigeria

Herd mortality distribution
in 306 farms affected by
outbreak, unit cost of testing
pigs for the presence of ASF in
Oyo State, Nigeria

Estimated annual value of pig
production losses from an
outbreak of ASFV in Nigeria

N/A

Other economic estimates

1950
BROWN et al.

Europe

Continent
Netherlands

Country
$227,881,000

Cost estimate
(2019 USDc )
Total cost

Economic
Measure

Direct costs of control
measures (transport
destruction of infected herds,
disinfection of premises,
indemnities to farmers,
vaccination, identification &
registration of pigs)

Economic estimation
description

N/A

Other economic estimates

To adjust values presented in paper to 2019 USD ($), year which the value presented in the paper represents must also be present. If this was not clearly given, the year of publication was assumed to be
the year belonging to the value. References used for calculations include: DeNederlandscheBank (2002), Antweiler (2019), European Central Bank (2019), United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019),
United States Department of the Treasury (2019).

c

2 years

Duration

(BCA) Benefit–cost analysis, (CGE) computable general equilibrium, (EIA) economic impact assessment, (I/O) input–output, (PE) partial equilibrium, (PBM), partial budget model, (FC) 'Financial costing'.

1983

Yearb

Year of outbreak. Was not always clearly provided.

b

a

Retrospective
(FC)

Retro./For.
analysis?
(economic
approacha )

(Continued)

Terpstra (1987)

ASF study

TA B L E A 2

BROWN et al.
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1951

Forecast (FC)

Forecast (FC)

Retrospective (PEA
& EpiCosts)

Forecast (PEA &
Excel)

Boklund
et al. (2009)

Mangen
et al. (2004)

Mangen
and Burrell
(2003)

Retro./For.
analysis? (Economic
approacha )

1997–1998

1997–1998

N/A

2010

Yearb

1 year

436 days
(large
epidemic)

15 days
(maximum
median)

129 days
(max
median)

Duration

Europe

Europe

Europe

Europe

Continent

Netherlands

Netherlands

Denmark

Netherlands + Germany

Country

Global economic impact estimates of classical swine fever (CSF) outbreaks

Hop
et al. (2016)

CSF Study

TA B L E A 3

$1,096,000,000

$1,172,343,683

$585,762,061

$81,142,730

Cost Estimate
(2019 USDc )

Total cost

Average
median cost

Maximum
median cost

Total cost

Economic
Measure

Government expenditures
[medium outbreak]
(depopulation, control of
quarantine, preventative
slaughter, welfare
slaughter, detected
farms)

Control cost [medium
outbreak] not explicitly
defined

Epidemic cost (public
costs: depopulated
pigs, culling, rendering,
cleaning, production loss,
blood tests, vaccination;
industry costs: empty
housing units, welfare
slaughter, 3-day national
standstill; export losses:
ban on pigs and pig
product export. Average
of upper and lower median
cost for production
herd and nucleus herd
presented here

Direct costs (disease
control, program
organization,
clinical examination,
depopulation of sows,
vaccination, destruction
of feed) + direct
consequential costs
(from disease control)

Economic Estimation
Description

Other Economic Estimates

|
(Continues)

Welfare measures, prices
changes during epidemic

Welfare measures,
regression analysis,
comparison to actual
epidemic costs

N/A

Costs for simulated
outbreaks for various
regions &control strategies.
Also address cross-border
spread among regions

1952
BROWN et al.

Forecast (FC)

Forecast (FC)

Forecast (Analysis
of costeffectiveness,
disclaim BCA)

Forecast (EpiLoss)

Forecast (FC)

Garner
et al. (2001)

Saatkamp
et al. (2000)

Meuwissen
et al. (1999)

Meuwissen
et al. (1999)

Retro./For.
analysis? (Economic
approacha )

(Continued)

Garner
et al. (2001)

CSF Study

TA B L E A 3

1997–1998

1997–1998

NA

NA

NA

Yearb

1 year

1 yr

16 weeks

3 weeks

3 weeks

Duration

Europe

Europe

Europe

Australia

Australia

Continent

Netherlands

Netherlands

Belgium, Netherlands

Australia

Australia

Country

$2,068,182,994

$3,663,548,983

$248,934,198

$58,338

$97,335,595

Cost Estimate
(2019 USDc )

Total cost

Total loss

Maximum
total loss

Total loss

Total cost

Economic
Measure

Direct costs
(compensation paid
for pigs and feed
destroyed, compensation
for sows under a
breeding prohibition,
organizational
aspects-equipment and
personnel for outbreak
response)

Economic loss (direct
costs, consequential
losses farms,
consequential losses
related industries)

Direct loss [current
policy] (removal, welfare
slaughter, operational
costs, reduced net cashflow trade and industry)

Direct loss [annual]
(production loss number of herds
affected, fall in output
[tons])

Direct costs [nation wide]
(stamped-out farms,
farms in restricted areas,
price effects [whole
industry)])

Economic Estimation
Description

Other Economic Estimates

(see below)

(see below)

(Continues)

Summary of reported direct
costs caused by CSF in
Belgium and Netherlands
(1990–1997)

Value of livestock affected
(Darling Downs), expected
on-farm costs (Darling
Downs, Northern Victoria),
costs associated with
movement restrictions,
expected gross income of
regional pig industry

Value of livestock affected
(Darling Downs), expected
on-farm costs (Darling
Downs, Northern Victoria),
costs associated with
movement restrictions,
expected gross income of
regional pig industry

BROWN et al.

|
1953

Forecast (I/O)

Garner and
Lack (1995)

NA

1997–1998

Yearb

12.5 (avg.)

1 year

Duration

Australia

Europe

Continent

Australia

Netherlands

Country

$364,411

$1,595,365,989

Cost Estimate
(2019 USDc )

Average cost

Total loss

Economic
Measure

Control cost [medium
outbreak] (output
effects, income
effects, job losses,
compensation) Average
of three regions presented
here

Consequential loss (farm
loss: idle production,
supply and delivery
problems, losses
from repopulation;
[related industries]
slaughterhouses, animal
traders, feed suppliers,
breeding organizations)
Added farm and related
industry loss

Economic Estimation
Description

Economic effects for footand-mouth disease and
sheep pox

(see above)

Other Economic Estimates

Year of outbreak. Was not always clearly provided.

To adjust values presented in paper to 2019 USD ($), year which the value presented in the paper represents must also be present. If this was not clearly given, the year of publication was assumed to be
the year belonging to the value. References used for calculations include: DeNederlandscheBank (2002), Antweiler (2019), European Central Bank (2019), United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019),
United States Department of the Treasury (2019).

c

b

a
(ASM) Agricultural sector model, (BCA) Benefit–cost analysis, (CGE) computable general equilibrium, (EIA) economic impact assessment, (I/O) input–output, (PE) partial equilibrium, (PBM), partial budget
model, (FC) 'Financial costing'.

Forecast (FC)

Retro./For.
analysis? (Economic
approacha )

(Continued)

Meuwissen
et al. (1999)

CSF Study

TA B L E A 3

1954
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Retrospective (CGE,
Global Trade Analysis
Project (Hertel,

Countryman and
Hagerman (2017)

Retrospective (CGE,
Global Trade Analysis
Project (Hertel,
1997)

Retrospective (CGE,
Global Trade Analysis
Project (Hertel,
1997)

Retrospective (CGE,
Global Trade Analysis
Project (Hertel,
1997)

Retrospective (CGE,
Global Trade Analysis
Project (Hertel,
1997)

Countryman and
Hagerman (2017)

Countryman and
Hagerman (2017)

Countryman and
Hagerman (2017)

Countryman and
Hagerman (2017)

1997)

Forecast CGE (REMI
Policy Insight +)

Retro./For. analysis?
(Economic approacha )

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2014

Yearb

1 year

1 year

1 year

1 year

1 year

2 years

Duration

South America

South America

South America

South America

South America

North America

Continent

Venezuela

Ecuador

Uruguay

Brazil

Argentina

USA

Country

Global economic impact estimates of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreaks

Miller et al. (2019)

FMD study

TA B L E A 4

$14,236

$27,301

$20,985,638

$39,221,659

$5,886,221

$13,063,884,307

Cost estimate
(2019 USDc )

Total loss

Total loss

Total loss

Total loss

Total loss

Maximum
total loss

Economic
measure

Loss in beef cattle production
value resulting from cattle
deaths, depopulation, sick
but not killed/dead

Loss in beef cattle production
value resulting from cattle
deaths, depopulation, sick
but not killed/dead

Loss in beef cattle production
value resulting from cattle
deaths, depopulation, sick
but not killed/dead

Loss in beef cattle production
value resulting from cattle
deaths, depopulation, sick
but not killed/dead

Loss in beef cattle production
value resulting from cattle
deaths, depopulation, sick
but not killed/dead

Vaccination strategies
and impacts on GDP and
employment over 10-year
study period + job losses by
industry sector

Economic estimation
description
Other economic estimates

|
(Continues)

Export market loss, export
enhancement shock
regression results, global
trade analysis, welfare
changes (equivalent
variation) in Latin America

Export market loss, export
enhancement shock
regression results, global
trade analysis, welfare
changes (equivalent
variation) in Latin America

Export market loss, export
enhancement shock
regression results, global
trade analysis, welfare
changes (equivalent
variation) in Latin America

Export market loss, export
enhancement shock
regression results, global
trade analysis, welfare
changes (equivalent
variation) in Latin America

Export market loss, export
enhancement shock
regression results, global
trade analysis, welfare
changes (equivalent
variation) in Latin America

Total government cost
(euthanasia, vaccination,
disposal, cleaning &
disinfecting, indemnity)
[presented in paper
Appendix]

BROWN et al.
1955

Retrospective (CGE,
Global Trade Analysis
Project (Hertel,
1997)

Forecast (BCA)

Forecast (PEA)

Retrospective (EIA)

Forecast (PBM)

Halasa, Bøtner,
et al. (2016)

Schroeder
et al. (2015)

Jemberu
et al. (2014)

Bergevoet and
Asseldonk (2014)

Retro./For. analysis?
(Economic approacha )

(Continued)

Countryman and
Hagerman (2017)

FMD study

TA B L E A 4

NA

2012

NA

NA

2001

Yearb

61 days

2 years

10 years

67 days
(median,
cattle herds)

1 year

Duration

Europe

Africa

North America

Europe

South America

Continent

Netherlands

Ethiopia

USA

Denmark

Colombia

Country

$171,229,404

$83

$13,063,884,307

$1,009,394,597

$537,499

Cost estimate
(2019 USDc )

Maximum
total loss

Total average
loss

Maximum
median total
cost

Total cost

Total loss

Economic
measure

Direct outbreak costs (culled
animals, destruction of
feed and milk, clearing and
disinfection, empty farm
buildings during outbreak,
costs of vaccinating,
costs of transportation
prohibition, loss of
vaccinated animals)

Economic loss [per herd]:
direct impacts (visible milk loss, draft power loss,
mortality loss + invisible
losses)

Government costs [with
emergency vaccination
strategy] (euthanasia,
indemnity, vaccination,
disposal, cleaning &
disinfection)

Government loss: direct
costs (surveillance,
depopulation, cleaning &
disinfection, empty housing,
compensation, national
standstill) + indirect costs
(export loss)

Loss in beef cattle production
value resulting from cattle
deaths, depopulation, sick
but not killed/dead

Economic estimation
description

|
(Continues)

Export loss of different
sectors due to logistic
processing and value of loss
given a vaccination strategy

Indirect impacts: additional
costs and revenues foregone

Welfare measures, returns to
capital and management

Other total costs varying by
control strategy, median
direct costs and export
losses

Export market loss, export
enhancement shock
regression results, global
trade analysis, welfare
changes (equivalent
variation) in Latin America

Other economic estimates

1956
BROWN et al.

Forecast (BCA)

Retrospective
(Aggregate national
and regional studies,
WHO)

Forecast (ASM)

Forecast (Economic
costing module)

Knight-Jones and
Rushton (2013)

Carpenter
et al. (2011)

Elbakidze
et al. (2009)

Retro./For. analysis?
(Economic approacha )

(Continued)

Boklund
et al. (2013)

FMD study

TA B L E A 4

N/A

NA

NA

NA

Yearb

Not given

22 days
(median)

1 year

80 days
(median)

Duration

North America

North America

Global

Europe

Continent

USA

USA
(California)

Multi-country

Denmark

Country

$1,410,000,000

$84,584,000,000

$12,983,000,000

$617,523,000

Cost estimate
(2019 USDc )

Average total
cost

Maximum
median total
loss

Total annual
average
cost + loss

Total median
cost + loss

Economic
measure

Loss [for high-intensive cattle
industry, compared to other
herd types presented]:
losses incurred within the
cattle industry because
of the outbreak (gross
lost value of animals and
lost gross income due
to temporary business
inactivity of affected
producers)

National loss in total
agricultural surplus

Government & producer
costs: diagnostic
tests + loss (milk production
loss, mortality, extrareplacement, condemnation,
loss from compulsory health
measures)

Direct costs [basic control
strategy] (surveillance,
depopulation, cleaning &
disinfection, empty stables,
compensation, welfare
slaughter, national standstill,
vaccination) + indirect costs
(export bans on livestock
and livestock products to
EU and non-EU countries)

Economic estimation
description

|
(Continues)

Median economic costs and
loss by herd type associated
with early detection/early &
delayed vaccine availability/
enhanced & regular
surveillance, cumulative
distribution of losses

Estimated total and
incremental daily economic
losses associated with
a diagnostic delay in a
California dairy

Global annual impact of
FMD-caused loss

Estimated costs from an
airborne virus strain

Other economic estimates

BROWN et al.
1957

Retro./For. analysis?
(Economic approacha )

Forecast (Economic
costing module)

Retrospective
(BCA + Participatory
Epidemiology (PE)
methods)

Forecast (FC)

Forecast (PEA & I/O)

Elbakidze
et al. (2009)

Barasa et al. (2008)

Senturk and Yalcin
(2008)

Pendell
et al. (2007)

(Continued)

FMD study

TA B L E A 4

NA

NA

2004

N/A

Yearb

89 days

Not given

1 year

Not given

Duration

North America

Transcontinent

Africa

North America

Continent

USA (Kansas,
region and
state-wide)

Turkey

South Sudan

USA

Country

$1,345,262,043

$15,881,000

$285,924

$312,176,320

Cost estimate
(2019 USDc )

Total impact

Total loss

Maximum
total cost

Max median
loss

Economic
measure

'Direct and total impact' [SW
Kansas and 'rest of Kansas']
associated with alternative
hypothetical FMD outbreak
scenarios (sum of respective
totals, see paper tables for
respective details of costs)

Production related loss
[national scale] (milk yield,
fertility, delay in age of first
calving, premature culling,
live-weight loss, expected
profit)

Costs of biannual foot-andmouth disease vaccination
of the entire cattle
population

Cost [for high-intensive cattle
industry, compared to other
herd types presented]:
disease management
strategy costs (slaughter,
costs of appraisal,
euthanasia, carcass disposal,
cleaning, disinfection,
quarantine implementation,
vaccination, surveillance) +
loss [cattle industry loss]:
gross lost value of animals
and lost gross income due
to temporary business
inactivity of affected
producers

Economic estimation
description

|
(Continues)

Changes in producer
surplus at market level,
economic value of livestock
production and processing
in SW Kansas, estimated
direct and total impacts
for SW Kansas and 'rest' of
Kansas (all with hypothetical
incidence scenarios), impact
on 'value-added' markets

Production loss (infected
animals) by production
animal type (e.g. heifer,
female calve) (milk yield,
fertility, delay in age of first
calving, premature culling,
live-weight loss, expected
profit), Weighted loss by
cattle breed (per head)

Mortality & milk production
effects, livelihoods analysis

Median economic costs and
loss by herd type associated
with early detection/early &
delayed vaccine availability/
enhanced & regular
surveillance, cumulative
distribution of losses

Other economic estimates

1958
BROWN et al.

Forecast (Reserve
Bank's internal
'forecasting and
policy system')

Forecast (CGE &
Micro-Regional
Tourism Simulation
Model)

Forecast (BCA)

Forecast (Welfare
impacts)

Blake et al. (2003)

Bates et al. (2003)

Schoenbaum and
Disney (2003)

Retro./For. analysis?
(Economic approacha )

(Continued)

Belton (2004)

FMD study

TA B L E A 4

NA

NA

2001

NA

Yearb

46 days
(median)

71 days
(median)

4 years

2 yrs

Duration

North America

North America

Europe

New Zealand

Continent

USA

USA
(3-county
region in
California)

Great Britain

New Zealand

Country

$569,041,718

$131,564,000

$5,816,068,000

$6,028,498,356

Cost estimate
(2019 USDc )

Maximum
median cost

Total cost

Total loss

Total nominal
GDP loss

Economic
measure

Government cost plus net
welfare change [Slaughter
(stamping out) strategy
3: contagious herds, and
herds with direct or indirect
contact]

Direct costs [for baseline
eradication strategy, typical
dry lot dairy] (slaughter,
indemnity, cleaning and
disinfection)

Government revenue loss:
total government revenue
loss after tax revenue and
direct effects of agriculture
(62% of costs to gov.) are
accounted for over two
years

Cumulative nominal GDP loss
[two years]

Economic estimation
description

|
(Continues)

Government cost of
control and eradication
& government cost of
control and eradication plus
net welfare change for 3
different herd populations,
2 rates of spread, 3
vaccination strategies and 4
slaughter strategies

Expected costs of indemnity
for slaughtered animals
and destroyed feedstuffs
and milk (for dry lot
diary, 3-county study
region); expected costs
for disposal, cleaning and
disinfection; direct costs
for supplemental strategies
with varying assumptions;
additional costs after
baseline costs

Tourism expenditure
reductions for UK economy
(2001), reductions in total
tourism expenditure and
GDP (2001–2004), change
in real factor earnings by
sector

Percent change in real GDP,
changes in unemployment,
aggregate demand,
investment, inflation and
exchange rate

Other economic estimates

BROWN et al.
1959

Retro./For. analysis?
(Economic approacha )

Forecast (Welfare
impacts)

Retrospective
(Welfare impacts)

Forecast (BCA)

Forecast (I/O)

Retrospective (FC)

Schoenbaum and
Disney (2003)

Thompson
et al. (2002)

Randolph
et al. (2002)

Mahul and Durand
(2000)

Yang et al. (1999)

(Continued)

FMD study

TA B L E A 4

5 months

8 weeks
(maximum)

~2 years

1 year

52 days
(median)

Duration

Asia

Europe

North America

Europe

North America

Continent

Taiwan

France

USA

Great Britain

USA

Country

$599,438,206

$298,595,841

$22,166,000

$6,498,109,640

$628,284,417

Cost estimate
(2019 USDc )

Total cost

Maximum
total cost

Maximum
total
cost + loss

Total cost

Maximum
median cost

Economic
measure

Financial cost:
control + market value loss

Direct cost: [maximum
reported among 3 control
strategies in two locations]
disease-control costs
and costs of vaccination,
compensation payments,
and costs due to movement
restriction on livestock and
livestock products

Cost [baseline scenario]:
control cost to
producers + loss:
production loss

sheep annual premium,
business support measures,
consumers of the U.K.)

Production (market prices,
export loss, withholding
costs, consequential loss,
sheep annual premium, agrimonetary aid; food industry
(auction markets, abattoirs,
processors/haulers); public
sector (compensation,
welfare scheme payments,
disposal costs, misc.
costs, agri-monetary aid,

Government cost plus net
welfare change [Vaccination
strategy: all scenarios (no
vaccine, early vaccine, late
vaccine)]

Economic estimation
description

N/A

(Continues)

Size and direct costs of
outbreak for various control
strategies, net loss

Benefit–cost indicators for
eradication scenarios under
varying export assumptions,
total present value of costs
& benefits over 25-year
horizon by sector

Income effects (agricultural
producers, food supply
chain); indirect/direct
effects on tourism; indirect
impacts (multipliers for
agriculture, tourism and
retail)

Government cost of
control and eradication
& government cost of
control and eradication plus
net welfare change for 3
different herd populations,
2 rates of spread, 3
vaccination strategies and 4
slaughter strategies

Other economic estimates

|

1997

N/A

1995–
1999

2001

N/A

Yearb

1960
BROWN et al.

Retrospective (FC)

Forecast (I/O)

Forecast (BCA)

Forecast (BCA)

Yang et al. (1999)

Garner and Lack
(1995)

Aulaqi & Sundquist
(1978) (from
McCauley
et al. (1978)

Aulaqi &
Sundquist, 1978
(from McCauley
et al. (1978)

NA

NA

N/A

1997

Yearb

Not given

Not given

12.5 (avg.)

5 months

Duration

North America

North America

Australia

Asia

Continent

USA

USA

Australia

Taiwan

Country

$33,628

$18,815,564

$1,914,374

$2,533,283,489

Cost estimate
(2019 USDc )

Maximum
total cost

Total loss

Total average
cost

Total loss

Economic
measure

Cost of FMD eradication for
different farm operations
[resulted presented - dairy
farm, free stall, 150 head]

Direct monetary loss [initial
year] (death & permanent
disability in cattle, calf
mortality abortions, death
losses in swine, death loss
in sheep, milk production
loss, milk cows culled FMD mastitis, other losses
- inefficient weight gain,
delayed conception)

Control costs [medium
outbreak]: production losses
(average across 3 regions is
reported in this table)

Direct loss as a result of
export ban of pork to Japan

Economic estimation
description

Net benefits from prevention,
export losses, labour and
time requirements for
eradication on infected
premises, short-run effects
on livestock sectors, direct
monetary loss (initial year)

Net benefits from prevention,
export losses, labour and
time requirements for
eradication on infected
premises, short-run effects
on livestock sectors, cost
of eradication for different
farm operations/sizes

Output effects, income
effects, job losses and
compensation

N/A

Other economic estimates

Year of outbreak. Was not always clearly provided.

To adjust values presented in paper to 2019 USD ($), year which the value presented in the paper represents must also be present. If this was not clearly given, the year of publication was assumed to be
the year belonging to the value. References used for calculations include: DeNederlandscheBank (2002), Antweiler (2019), European Central Bank (2019), United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019),
United States Department of the Treasury (2019).

c

b

(ASM) Agricultural sector model, (BCA) Benefit–cost analysis, (CGE) computable general equilibrium, (EIA) economic impact assessment, (I/O) input–output, (PE) partial equilibrium, (PBM), partial budget
model, (FC) 'Financial costing'

a

Retro./For. analysis?
(Economic approacha )

(Continued)

FMD study

TA B L E A 4
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TA B L E A 5
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(Global) Number of outbreaks by country and livestock population estimates (head)

Country Name

# FMD

# ASF

# CSF

Total #
Outbreaks

2018 Livestock
Pop. (head)

2018 Swine
Pop. (head)

2018 Human Pop.

Afghanistan

4

0

0

4

24,790,567

—

37,171,921

Albania

3

0

4

7

4,880,269

231,680

2,882,740

Algeria

2

0

0

2

42,066,070

2,792

42,228,408

Angola

3

0

0

3

4,230,156

1,479,676

30,809,787

Antarctica

0

0

0

0

—

—

—

Argentina

5

0

3

8

26,123,915

6,778,976

44,361,150

Armenia

4

4

1

9

1,999,698

238,197

2,951,745

Australia

0

0

0

0

48,579,310

5,378,100

24,898,152

Austria

1

0

2

3

6,798,064

5,151,074

8,891,388

Azerbaijan

2

2

0

4

8,406,305

9,220

9,949,537

Bahamas

0

0

0

0

22,793

6,657

385,637

Bangladesh

9

0

1

10

70,277,526

—

161,376,708

Belarus

1

2

1

4

8,111,912

4,711,909

9,452,617

Belgium

1

3

3

7

12,827,789

11,230,544

11,482,178

Belize

0

0

1

1

54,759

39,003

383,071

Benin

9

9

0

18

2,321,858

207,606

11,485,044

Bhutan

10

0

7

17

229,165

19,185

754,388

Bolivia

9

0

7

16

6,753,435

2,145,000

11,353,142

Bosnia and
Herz.

0

0

8

8

754,826

101,509

3,323,925

Botswana

14

2

0

16

974,861

13,006

2,254,068

Brazil

8

1

13

22

112,701,965

42,642,601

209,469,323

Brunei

0

0

0

0

9,437

1,424

428,963

Bulgaria

2

3

13

18

3,870,061

1,215,786

7,051,608

Burkina Faso

9

4

0

13

15,140,536

1,488,298

19,751,466

Burundi

4

5

0

9

1,362,765

83,664

11,175,374

Cambodia

8

1

3

12

2,388,054

1,729,610

16,249,792

Cameroon

9

9

0

18

7,486,838

1,103,239

25,216,267

Canada

0

0

0

0

26,942,592

21,561,500

37,074,562

Central African
Rep.

5

4

0

9

3,052,998

616,519

4,666,368

Chad

8

6

0

14

28,238,491

79,898

15,477,729

Chile

1

0

1

2

7,746,152

5,011,692

18,729,160

China

25

4

16

45

1,090,792,328

694,540,656

1,427,647,786

Colombia

13

0

9

22

14,282,063

4,001,545

49,661,048

Congo

0

4

0

4

247,485

47,576

5,244,359

Costa Rica

0

0

2

2

1,768,731

862,448

4,999,441

Cote d'Ivoire

7

6

0

13

1,786,867

233,117

25,069,230

Croatia

1

0

6

7

2,606,234

1,567,200

4,156,405

Cuba

0

1

6

7

5,759,300

4,068,300

11,338,134

Cyprus

1

0

0

1

1,254,596

560,255

1,189,265

Czech Rep.

1

1

4

6

3,311,974

2,413,685

10,665,677

Dem. Rep.
Congo

0

4

0

4

2,503,101

541,811

84,068,091

Dem. Rep.
Korea

3

1

0

4

7,042,121

2,611,312

25,549,604

Denmark

1

0

0

1

19,231,680

18,085,605

5,752,126

(Continues)
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(Continued)

Country Name

# FMD

# ASF

# CSF

Total #
Outbreaks

2018 Livestock
Pop. (head)

2018 Swine
Pop. (head)

2018 Human Pop.

Djibouti

0

0

1

1

516,423

—

958,923

Dominican Rep.

0

1

9

10

2,208,970

1,206,593

10,627,141

Ecuador

12

0

9

21

4,584,210

2,302,472

17,084,358

Egypt

7

0

0

7

13,425,639

15,811

98,423,598

El Salvador

0

0

7

7

477,669

147,279

6,420,746

Eq. Guinea

—

—

—

0

17,906

3,731

1,308,975

Eritrea

8

0

0

8

2,864,107

—

3,452,786

Estonia

1

5

1

7

686,578

537,888

1,322,920

Ethiopia

9

1

0

10

36,875,284

41,147

109,224,414

Falkland Is.

0

0

0

0

46,271

—

3,234

Fiji

0

0

0

0

142,931

94,558

883,483

Finland

0

0

0

0

2,450,979

1,827,840

5,522,576

Fr. S. Antarctic
Lands

0

0

0

0

—

—

—

France

2

0

5

7

40,473,477

23,574,409

64,990,511

Gabon

0

0

0

0

236,059

119,368

2,119,275

Gambia

4

3

0

7

220,932

12,503

2,280,094

Georgia

7

2

1

10

1,638,640

464,538

4,002,942

Germany

1

0

10

11

65,726,989

56,895,229

83,124,418

Ghana

9

5

0

14

4,576,933

648,215

29,767,102

Greece

2

0

1

3

19,178,575

1,333,675

10,522,246

Greenland

—

—

—

0

16,906

—

56,564

Guatemala

0

0

11

11

3,211,402

1,320,445

17,247,849

Guinea

5

0

0

5

4,117,454

83,375

12,414,293

Guinea-Bissau

2

0

0

2

1,070,784

383,809

1,874,303

Guyana

1

0

0

1

119,726

5,709

779,006

Haiti

0

1

6

7

2,210,602

572,692

11,123,178

Honduras

0

0

9

9

1,058,566

184,007

9,587,522

Hungary

0

3

2

5

5,470,313

4,972,737

9,707,499

Iceland

0

0

0

0

730,780

81,442

336,713

India

9

0

9

18

241,820,866

8,461,298

1,352,642,280

Indonesia

1

1

9

11

44,853,983

16,476,007

267,670,543

Iran

10

0

0

10

42,801,621

—

81,800,188

Iraq

6

0

0

6

6,791,366

—

38,433,600

Ireland

1

0

0

1

10,047,900

3,446,700

4,818,690

Israel

15

0

1

16

1,719,944

170,809

8,381,516

Italy

1

35

7

43

24,451,688

11,251,367

60,627,291

Jamaica

0

0

0

0

749,828

124,176

2,934,847

Japan

2

0

2

4

18,370,787

16,430,235

127,202,192

Jordan

5

0

0

5

4,445,442

—

9,965,318

Kazakhstan

10

0

0

10

15,618,202

1,154,733

18,319,618

Kenya

9

0

11

20

25,386,794

388,200

51,392,565

Korea

8

1

9

18

15,230,382

11,332,812

51,171,706

Kosovo

1

0

9

10

8,836,806

—

1,932,774

Kuwait

11

0

0

11

2,558,216

—

4,137,312

Kyrgyzstan

7

0

1

8

5,147,138

229,748

6,304,030

(Continues)
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Country Name

# FMD

# ASF

# CSF

Total #
Outbreaks

2018 Livestock
Pop. (head)

2018 Swine
Pop. (head)

2018 Human Pop.

Lao PDR

10

1

8

19

3,168,232

2,538,393

7,061,507

Latvia

1

10

2

13

794,214

486,130

1,928,459

Lebanon

11

0

0

11

1,237,385

10,855

6,859,408

Lesotho

0

0

0

0

1,069,171

71,429

2,108,328

Liberia

0

0

0

0

520,490

264,926

4,818,973

Libya

6

0

0

6

5,919,019

—

6,678,559

Lithuania

1

6

3

10

1,430,142

892,692

2,801,264

Luxembourg

0

0

6

6

245,148

159,924

604,245

Macedonia

1

0

7

8

1,156,435

145,000

2,082,957

Madagascar

0

7

9

16

5,141,526

932,251

26,262,313

Malawi

13

9

0

22

18,552,554

9,395,370

18,143,217

Malaysia

9

0

15

24

1,777,337

1,465,311

31,528,033

Mali

8

2

0

10

48,892,857

59,605

19,077,749

Mauritania

8

0

0

8

8,362,146

—

4,403,313

Mexico

0

0

10

10

36,743,298

18,526,707

126,190,788

Moldova

0

8

0

8

1,720,287

740,465

3,364,496

Mongolia

11

1

6

18

23,239,008

13,771

3,170,216

Montenegro

—

—

—

0

289,948

34,101

627,809

Morocco

5

0

0

5

18,794,043

12,868

36,029,093

Mozambique

9

9

0

18

5,250,678

2,279,523

29,496,004

Myanmar

14

1

7

22

25,369,278

12,506,464

53,708,320

N. Cyprus

0

0

0

0

—

—

1,266,676

Namibia

11

9

0

20

1,436,543

101,197

2,448,301

Nepal

11

0

9

20

13,294,059

731,435

28,095,714

Netherlands

2

1

3

6

19,713,748

15,246,163

17,059,560

New Caledonia

0

0

0

0

48,233

32,514

279,993

New Zealand

0

0

0

0

34,176,136

680,169

4,743,131

Nicaragua

0

0

8

8

1,834,069

235,600

6,465,501

Niger

9

0

0

9

14,487,751

33,480

22,442,822

Nigeria

8

12

0

20

55,522,573

6,306,518

195,874,683

Norway

0

0

0

0

3,658,387

1,703,823

5,337,962

Oman

8

0

0

8

3,840,898

—

4,829,473

Pakistan

8

0

0

8

81,482,184

—

212,228,286

Palestine

12

0

0

12

1,315,008

—

4,862,979

Panama

0

0

0

0

1,066,130

594,917

4,176,869

Papua New
Guinea

0

0

0

0

2,042,330

2,014,729

8,606,323

Paraguay

5

0

1

6

4,722,134

2,315,343

6,956,066

Peru

5

0

9

14

8,688,064

3,090,907

31,989,260

Philippines

9

1

9

19

32,353,557

27,712,985

106,651,394

Poland

0

9

1

10

27,092,284

22,779,899

37,921,592

Portugal

1

9

1

11

7,468,718

5,550,127

10,256,193

Puerto Rico

0

0

0

0

203,382

62,137

3,039,596

Qatar

6

0

0

6

999,725

—

2,781,682

Romania

0

5

4

9

22,635,877

5,579,000

19,506,114

Russia

15

13

21

49

73,654,466

41,746,342

145,734,038

(Continues)
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Country Name

# FMD

# ASF

# CSF

Total #
Outbreaks

2018 Livestock
Pop. (head)

2018 Swine
Pop. (head)

2018 Human Pop.

Rwanda

4

3

0

7

2,665,835

234,179

12,301,970

Saudi Arabia

10

0

0

10

11,380,905

—

33,702,756

Senegal

8

8

0

16

6,623,796

274,082

15,854,323

Serbia

0

2

1

3

8,546,858

5,744,543

8,802,754

Sierra Leone

1

0

0

1

694,055

34,131

7,650,150

Slovakia

0

1

10

11

1,141,768

638,317

5,453,014

Slovenia

0

0

2

2

683,313

325,354

2,077,837

Solomon Is.

—

—

—

0

66,555

60,011

652,857

Somalia

1

0

0

1

22,010,802

2,036

15,008,226

Somaliland

—

—

—

0

—

—

4,500,000

South Africa

18

14

0

32

13,676,415

2,802,484

57,792,518

Spain

1

9

5

15

70,682,711

52,289,200

46,692,858

Sri Lanka

9

0

6

15

817,561

19,077

21,228,763

Sudan

3

—

0

3

83,079,000

—

43,100,000

S. Sudan

3

—

0

3

41,875,603

—

10,975,927

Suriname

0

0

0

0

43,026

30,209

575,990

Swaziland

3

0

0

3

—

—

1,104,479

Sweden

0

0

0

0

3,664,910

2,646,040

9,971,638

Switzerland

1

0

3

4

4,085,305

2,568,789

8,525,611

Syria

3

0

0

3

18,745,765

—

16,945,057

Taiwan

1

—

—

1

—

8,073,454

23,603,049

Tajikistan

5

0

1

6

5,217,641

12,000

9,100,835

Tanzania

9

8

0

17

19,831,261

374,524

56,313,438

Thailand

9

0

7

16

14,239,826

13,362,014

69,428,453

Timor-Leste

0

1

1

2

392,111

289,726

1,267,974

Togo

6

7

0

13

1,547,062

325,220

7,889,093

Trinidad and
Tobago

0

0

0

0

42,171

16,597

1,389,843

Tunisia

5

0

0

5

5,624,953

2,463

11,565,201

Turkey

12

0

0

12

61,302,557

—

82,340,088

Turkmenistan

3

0

1

4

11,100,463

4,625

5,850,901

Uganda

11

9

0

20

12,100,044

2,153,110

42,729,036

Ukraine

1

14

3

18

13,895,041

8,135,100

44,246,156

United Arab
Emirates

8

0

0

8

5,891,091

—

9,630,959

United Kingdom

5

0

2

7

30,048,000

10,938,000

67,141,684

United States

0

0

1

1

170,883,118

124,512,300

327,096,265

Uzbekistan

1

0

1

2

19,875,506

236,828

32,476,244

Vanuatu

0

0

0

0

112,258

73,988

298,333

Uruguay

3

0

1

4

4,272,703

198,000

3,449,285

Venezuela

9

0

5

14

6,632,551

2,382,941

28,887,118

Vietnam

11

1

9

21

52,795,473

49,743,746

95,545,962

W. Sahara

—

—

—

0

148,828

—

567,402

Yemen

7

0

0

7

16,690,868

—

28,498,683

Zambia

13

16

0

29

3,194,712

741,874

17,351,708

Zimbabwe

13

4

0

17

3,942,135

323,713

14,438,802
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